<!-- START doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->
<!-- DON'T EDIT THIS SECTION, INSTEAD RE-RUN doctoc TO UPDATE -->
**Table of Contents**

- [ggen v3 Security & Threat Model Analysis](#ggen-v3-security--threat-model-analysis)
  - [Table of Contents](#table-of-contents)
  - [Security Architecture](#security-architecture)
    - [Defense in Depth Strategy](#defense-in-depth-strategy)
    - [Trust Boundaries](#trust-boundaries)
  - [Threat Model](#threat-model)
    - [Threat Actors](#threat-actors)
    - [Attack Vectors](#attack-vectors)
      - [1. Malicious Ontology Injection](#1-malicious-ontology-injection)
      - [2. Marketplace Package Tampering](#2-marketplace-package-tampering)
      - [3. Template Injection Attacks](#3-template-injection-attacks)
  - [Cryptography & Signing](#cryptography--signing)
    - [Cryptographic Scheme](#cryptographic-scheme)
    - [Signature Verification Chain](#signature-verification-chain)
    - [Validation Receipt Signing](#validation-receipt-signing)
  - [Code Generation Security](#code-generation-security)
    - [Template Security Model](#template-security-model)
    - [Generated Code Security](#generated-code-security)
  - [Data Protection](#data-protection)
    - [Encryption at Rest](#encryption-at-rest)
    - [Encryption in Transit](#encryption-in-transit)
  - [Supply Chain Security](#supply-chain-security)
    - [Dependency Management](#dependency-management)
    - [Build Integrity](#build-integrity)
  - [Compliance Frameworks](#compliance-frameworks)
    - [Framework Coverage](#framework-coverage)
    - [Compliance Guards](#compliance-guards)
  - [Security Testing](#security-testing)
    - [Test Coverage](#test-coverage)
    - [Fuzzing Strategy](#fuzzing-strategy)
    - [Security Regression Testing](#security-regression-testing)
  - [Security Incident Response](#security-incident-response)
    - [Incident Reporting](#incident-reporting)
    - [Disclosure Policy](#disclosure-policy)
  - [Security Checklist](#security-checklist)
    - [Pre-Release Security Validation](#pre-release-security-validation)

<!-- END doctoc generated TOC please keep comment here to allow auto update -->

# ggen v3 Security & Threat Model Analysis

**Status**: COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SPECIFICATION
**Version**: 3.0.0-alpha
**Scope**: Security architecture, threat model, mitigations, compliance

---

## Table of Contents

1. [Security Architecture](#architecture)
2. [Threat Model](#threat-model)
3. [Cryptography & Signing](#cryptography)
4. [Code Generation Security](#code-gen-security)
5. [Data Protection](#data-protection)
6. [Supply Chain Security](#supply-chain)
7. [Compliance Frameworks](#compliance)
8. [Security Testing](#testing)

---

## Security Architecture

### Defense in Depth Strategy

```
Layer 1: Input Validation
  ↓
Layer 2: Authorization & Authentication
  ↓
Layer 3: Ontology Validation (SHACL)
  ↓
Layer 4: Template Validation
  ↓
Layer 5: Code Generation Validation
  ↓
Layer 6: Output Verification
  ↓
Layer 7: Cryptographic Signing
```

### Trust Boundaries

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│      Trusted: ggen v3 Codebase         │  (Open source, peer reviewed)
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│      User-Provided Ontologies           │  (Validate with SHACL)
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│      Marketplace Packages                │  (Signed + scored)
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│      Generated Code                      │  (Validated before output)
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│      External Services (LLMs, Repos)    │  (Sandboxed, no trust)
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

---

## Threat Model

### Threat Actors

| Actor | Capability | Motivation | Impact |
|-------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| **Malicious User** | Craft malicious ontologies | Inject backdoors | High |
| **Insider** | Modify ggen source | Introduce vulns | Critical |
| **Supply Chain Attacker** | Compromise marketplace packages | Widespread backdoors | Critical |
| **Man-in-the-Middle** | Intercept LLM requests | Data exfiltration | Medium |
| **Accidental Misuse** | Misuse valid features | Logic errors | Medium |

### Attack Vectors

#### 1. Malicious Ontology Injection

**Threat**: User provides ontology that generates code with security issues

```
ggen_malicious.ttl:
  ├─ SQL injection vulnerability in template
  ├─ XSS vulnerability in generated code
  ├─ Hardcoded secrets in types
  └─ Privilege escalation patterns
```

**Mitigation**:
```
1. SHACL Validation
   ├─ Enforce ontology schema
   ├─ Validate all constraints are well-formed
   ├─ Reject patterns known to cause vulns
   └─ Whitelist allowed property values

2. Code Analysis Post-Generation
   ├─ SAST scan (Semgrep, Clippy)
   ├─ Check for hardcoded secrets
   ├─ Validate SQL/HTML output patterns
   └─ Forbid dangerous macros/unsafe code

3. Guard System
   ├─ SecurityGuard: Scan for common vulns
   ├─ ComplianceGuard: Enforce standards
   └─ ArchitectureGuard: Enforce patterns
```

**Implementation**:

```rust
pub struct SecurityGuard;

impl Guard for SecurityGuard {
    fn check(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<ValidationReceipt, GuardError> {
        let mut receipt = ValidationReceipt::new();

        // 1. Check for SQL injection patterns
        self.check_sql_injection(package)?;

        // 2. Check for XSS vulnerabilities
        self.check_xss_vulnerabilities(package)?;

        // 3. Check for hardcoded secrets
        self.check_hardcoded_secrets(package)?;

        // 4. Check for unsafe code
        self.check_unsafe_code(package)?;

        // 5. SAST analysis
        self.run_semgrep_scan(package)?;

        Ok(receipt)
    }
}

impl SecurityGuard {
    fn check_sql_injection(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<(), GuardError> {
        let dangerous_patterns = [
            r#"format!("SELECT.*{}"#,  // String interpolation in SQL
            r#"concat.*sql"#,           // String concat in SQL
            r#"execute.*format!"#,      // Execute with format!
        ];

        for file in package.source_files() {
            for pattern in &dangerous_patterns {
                let regex = Regex::new(pattern)?;
                if regex.find(file.content()).is_some() {
                    return Err(GuardError::SqlInjectionDetected);
                }
            }
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    fn check_hardcoded_secrets(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<(), GuardError> {
        // Use detect-secrets library
        let detector = SecretsDetector::new();

        for file in package.source_files() {
            if detector.detect(file.content())? {
                return Err(GuardError::HardcodedSecretsDetected);
            }
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

#### 2. Marketplace Package Tampering

**Threat**: Compromised marketplace package with malicious code

**Mitigation**:
```
1. Cryptographic Signing
   ├─ Publisher signs package with ML-DSA key
   ├─ ggen verifies signature before use
   ├─ Signed validation receipts included
   └─ Chain of custody recorded

2. Package Sandboxing
   ├─ Extract packages to isolated directory
   ├─ Run validation in sandbox
   ├─ Restrict file access
   └─ No network access during gen

3. Binary Transparency
   ├─ Log all packages to append-only log
   ├─ Users can verify package history
   ├─ Detect deletion/modification
   └─ Fork detection mechanism
```

**Implementation**:

```rust
pub struct PackageVerifier;

impl PackageVerifier {
    pub fn verify_package(&self, package_path: &Path) -> Result<VerifiedPackage, VerifyError> {
        // 1. Extract package
        let extracted = extract_package(package_path)?;

        // 2. Verify signature
        let signature = extracted.read_signature()?;
        let public_key = self.fetch_publisher_key(&extracted.publisher)?;

        if !ml_dsa_verify(&extracted.content_hash(), &signature, public_key)? {
            return Err(VerifyError::InvalidSignature);
        }

        // 3. Verify receipt
        let receipt = extracted.read_validation_receipt()?;
        self.verify_receipt_signature(&receipt)?;

        // 4. Check production readiness score
        if receipt.score < 70 {
            return Err(VerifyError::LowReadinessScore);
        }

        // 5. Sandbox validation
        let sandbox = Sandbox::new()?;
        sandbox.validate_package(&extracted)?;

        Ok(VerifiedPackage {
            content: extracted,
            signature_verified: true,
            receipt,
            sandbox_validated: true,
        })
    }

    fn verify_receipt_signature(&self, receipt: &ValidationReceipt) -> Result<(), VerifyError> {
        let receipt_json = serde_json::to_string(receipt)?;
        let ggen_key = self.get_ggen_signing_key();

        if !ml_dsa_verify(&receipt_json, &receipt.signature, ggen_key)? {
            return Err(VerifyError::InvalidReceiptSignature);
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

#### 3. Template Injection Attacks

**Threat**: User-provided templates containing Tera template injection

**Example**:
```jinja2
// Malicious template
pub const SECRET = "{{ env::SECRET }}";  // Leaks environment variable
pub struct Data {
    pub field: String = "{% for item in get_all_database_records() %}..."
}
```

**Mitigation**:
```rust
pub struct TemplateValidator;

impl TemplateValidator {
    pub fn validate_template(&self, template: &str) -> Result<(), ValidationError> {
        // 1. Parse template
        let tera_env = Tera::new("templates/**/*.tmpl")?;

        // 2. Validate no dangerous functions
        let dangerous_functions = [
            "env::",        // No env variable access
            "include",      // No file inclusion
            "extends",      // No inheritance
            "import",       // No imports
            "macros",       // Limited macro usage
        ];

        for func in &dangerous_functions {
            if template.contains(func) {
                return Err(ValidationError::DangerousFunctionDetected);
            }
        }

        // 3. Limit Tera features
        let mut safe_tera = Tera::new("templates/**/*.tmpl")?;
        safe_tera.register_filter("dangerous", |_| Err("Blocked".into()));

        // 4. Render in sandbox
        let safe_context = Context::new();
        let _result = safe_tera.render("template", &safe_context)?;

        Ok(())
    }
}
```

---

## Cryptography & Signing

### Cryptographic Scheme

```
Algorithm: ML-DSA (FIPS 204)
Key Size: 2048 bits
Signing: SPHINCS+/CRYSTALS-Dilithium
Hashing: SHA-3 (FIPS 202)
Reason: Post-quantum security (resistant to quantum attacks)
```

### Signature Verification Chain

```
Package Content
  ├─ Hash: SHA-3(package_bytes)
  └─ Signature: ML-DSA-Sign(hash, private_key)

Verification:
  1. Extract package
  2. Compute hash of content
  3. Extract signature
  4. Fetch publisher's ML-DSA public key
  5. Verify: ML-DSA-Verify(hash, signature, public_key)
  6. Check certificate chain
  7. Verify timestamp (package age)
```

### Validation Receipt Signing

```rust
pub struct ValidationReceipt {
    pub package_name: String,
    pub version: String,
    pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
    pub checks: Vec<CheckResult>,
    pub score: i32,
    pub maturity_level: MaturityLevel,
    pub signature: String,  // ML-DSA(receipt, ggen_private_key)
    pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}

// Generate receipt
pub fn generate_receipt(package: &Package) -> Result<ValidationReceipt, Error> {
    let mut receipt = ValidationReceipt {
        package_name: package.name.clone(),
        version: package.version.clone(),
        timestamp: Utc::now(),
        checks: vec![],  // Populated by guards
        score: 0,
        maturity_level: MaturityLevel::Alpha,
        signature: String::new(),
        expires_at: Utc::now() + Duration::days(365),
    };

    // Run all guards
    let score = run_all_guards(&package)?;
    receipt.score = score;
    receipt.maturity_level = MaturityLevel::from_score(score);

    // Sign receipt
    let receipt_json = serde_json::to_string(&receipt)?;
    let ggen_private_key = load_ggen_signing_key();
    receipt.signature = ml_dsa_sign(&receipt_json, &ggen_private_key)?;

    Ok(receipt)
}
```

---

## Code Generation Security

### Template Security Model

```
Templates can access:
  ✓ Ontology entities (read-only)
  ✓ Query results (filtered)
  ✓ Configuration (whitelist)

Templates cannot access:
  ✗ Environment variables
  ✗ File system (except output)
  ✗ Network
  ✗ System commands
  ✗ External processes
```

### Generated Code Security

**Rust Security Policy**:
```toml
# Cargo.toml enforced settings
[profile.release]
lto = true              # Link-time optimization
codegen-units = 1      # Optimizations for security
strip = false          # Keep symbols for debugging

# Enforce warnings as errors
[dependencies.warnings]
level = "deny"          # All warnings = compilation error
```

**Lint Rules**:
```rust
#![deny(
    unsafe_code,            // No unsafe
    missing_docs,           // All pub items documented
    missing_debug_impl,     // Debug for all types
    warnings,               // All warnings forbidden
    rust_2018_idioms,       // Modern Rust patterns
    rust_2021_idioms,       // Latest idioms
)]

#![forbid(
    unsafe_code,            // Never allow unsafe
    unsafe_impl,            // No unsafe trait impls
    unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn, // Careful with unsafe
)]
```

---

## Data Protection

### Encryption at Rest

```rust
pub struct EncryptedField<T> {
    ciphertext: Vec<u8>,
    nonce: [u8; 12],
    phantom: PhantomData<T>,
}

impl<T: Serialize> EncryptedField<T> {
    pub fn encrypt(value: &T, key: &EncryptionKey) -> Result<Self> {
        let plaintext = serde_json::to_vec(value)?;

        // AES-256-GCM encryption
        let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key);
        let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(generate_random_nonce());
        let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_ref())?;

        Ok(EncryptedField {
            ciphertext,
            nonce: *nonce,
            phantom: PhantomData,
        })
    }

    pub fn decrypt(&self, key: &EncryptionKey) -> Result<T> {
        let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key);
        let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&self.nonce);
        let plaintext = cipher.decrypt(nonce, self.ciphertext.as_ref())?;
        serde_json::from_slice(&plaintext)
    }
}

// Usage in generated code
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Patient {
    pub id: String,
    #[serde(serialize_with = "serialize_encrypted", deserialize_with = "deserialize_encrypted")]
    pub ssn: EncryptedField<String>,  // Encrypted at rest
}
```

### Encryption in Transit

```
Transport Security:
  ├─ TLS 1.3 minimum
  ├─ AEAD ciphers only (AES-256-GCM)
  ├─ Perfect forward secrecy
  ├─ OCSP stapling
  └─ Certificate pinning for API calls
```

---

## Supply Chain Security

### Dependency Management

```
Dependency Security Model:
  1. Pin all transitive dependencies
  2. Run cargo-audit on every build
  3. No unvetted dependencies
  4. Minimal dependency count
  5. Security audit required for major deps
```

**Dependency Audit**:
```bash
# CI/CD pipeline
cargo audit              # Detect known vulnerabilities
cargo deny             # Policy enforcement
cargo tree             # Inspect dependency tree
cargo-bom              # Generate SBOM
```

### Build Integrity

```
Reproducible Builds:
  ├─ Pinned Rust version
  ├─ Locked Cargo.lock
  ├─ Deterministic output
  ├─ Signed binary hashes
  └─ Build attestation
```

---

## Compliance Frameworks

### Framework Coverage

| Framework | Applicability | Implementation |
|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
| **HIPAA** | Healthcare packages | Encryption, audit logs, access controls |
| **PCI-DSS** | Payment packages | Secure coding, no hardcoded secrets |
| **GDPR** | Data protection | Encryption, data minimization, right to deletion |
| **SOC 2** | All enterprise packages | Logging, access controls, change management |
| **FIPS 140** | Cryptography | Use approved algorithms (ML-DSA, AES-256-GCM) |

### Compliance Guards

```rust
// HIPAA compliance guard
pub struct HIPAAGuard;

impl Guard for HIPAAGuard {
    fn check(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<ValidationReceipt, GuardError> {
        // 1. PHI encryption required
        // 2. Audit logging present
        // 3. Access control enforced
        // 4. Breach notification procedures
        // 5. Data retention policies
        Ok(receipt)
    }
}

// PCI-DSS compliance guard
pub struct PCIDSSGuard;

impl Guard for PCIDSSGuard {
    fn check(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<ValidationReceipt, GuardError> {
        // 1. No hardcoded credentials
        // 2. Strong encryption in transit
        // 3. Secure development practices
        // 4. Security testing required
        // 5. Change management processes
        Ok(receipt)
    }
}

// GDPR compliance guard
pub struct GDPRGuard;

impl Guard for GDPRGuard {
    fn check(&self, package: &Package) -> Result<ValidationReceipt, GuardError> {
        // 1. Data minimization enforced
        // 2. Consent mechanism present
        // 3. Right to deletion implemented
        // 4. Data portability enabled
        // 5. Privacy by design
        Ok(receipt)
    }
}
```

---

## Security Testing

### Test Coverage

```
Security Test Types:
  ├─ Static Analysis
  │   ├─ Semgrep rules for common vulns
  │   ├─ Clippy for Rust-specific issues
  │   └─ cargo-deny for supply chain
  │
  ├─ Dynamic Analysis
  │   ├─ Fuzzing generated code
  │   ├─ Property-based testing
  │   └─ Penetration testing
  │
  ├─ Cryptographic Validation
  │   ├─ ML-DSA signature verification
  │   ├─ Encryption/decryption tests
  │   └─ Key management procedures
  │
  └─ Compliance Validation
      ├─ Audit trail verification
      ├─ Encryption enforcement
      └─ Access control testing
```

### Fuzzing Strategy

```rust
#[cfg(test)]
mod fuzzing {
    use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;

    fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
        // Test 1: Parse arbitrary ontology
        if let Ok(ontology_str) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
            let _ = parse_ontology(ontology_str);
        }

        // Test 2: Render arbitrary template
        if let Ok(template_str) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
            let _ = render_template(template_str, &Context::new());
        }

        // Test 3: Validate arbitrary guard
        if let Ok(guard_json) = std::str::from_utf8(data) {
            let _ = validate_guard_definition(guard_json);
        }
    });
}
```

### Security Regression Testing

```bash
# Security test suite
cargo test --test security
  ├─ test_no_sql_injection
  ├─ test_no_xss_vulnerabilities
  ├─ test_no_hardcoded_secrets
  ├─ test_encryption_working
  ├─ test_signature_verification
  ├─ test_template_injection_blocked
  └─ test_sandbox_isolation
```

---

## Security Incident Response

### Incident Reporting

```
Security Vulnerability Report:
  ├─ Email: security@ggen.io
  ├─ GPG Key: [public key]
  └─ Response SLA: 24 hours
```

### Disclosure Policy

```
Coordinated Disclosure:
  1. Report to security@ggen.io
  2. ggen validates issue
  3. Fix developed & tested
  4. Patch released
  5. CVE assigned (if applicable)
  6. Public announcement

Timeline: 90 days maximum
```

---

## Security Checklist

### Pre-Release Security Validation

- [ ] All dependencies audited (cargo-audit passes)
- [ ] No unsafe code in generated sections
- [ ] SAST scan passes (Semgrep, Clippy)
- [ ] Cryptographic signatures verified
- [ ] Validation receipts signed
- [ ] Sandbox tested
- [ ] Compliance guards implemented
- [ ] Security tests pass
- [ ] Fuzzing finds no crashes
- [ ] Penetration testing completed
- [ ] Incident response procedures documented
- [ ] Security documentation complete

---

**Document Version**: 1.0
**Created**: November 17, 2025
**Compliance**: HIPAA, PCI-DSS, GDPR, SOC 2
**Cryptography**: FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 202 (SHA-3)
