OpenAI Codex v0.93.0 (research preview)
--------
workdir: /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core
model: gpt-5.2-codex
provider: openai
approval: never
sandbox: workspace-write [workdir, /tmp, $TMPDIR]
reasoning effort: xhigh
reasoning summaries: auto
session id: 019c29e5-0fbf-74d2-8063-c59bb73bdac7
--------
user
current changes
mcp: digitalocean starting
mcp: digitalocean starting
mcp: digitalocean ready
mcp startup: ready: digitalocean
mcp: digitalocean ready
mcp startup: ready: digitalocean

thinking
**Checking unstaged changes**

I'm preparing to use git status and diff to identify any unstaged or modified files in the repository.
thinking
**Checking unstaged changes**

I'm preparing to use git status and diff to identify any unstaged or modified files in the repository.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git status --short' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 31ms:
 M .planning/STATE.json
 D .planning/reviews/build.md
 D .planning/reviews/code-quality.md
 M .planning/reviews/codex.md
 D .planning/reviews/complexity.md
 D .planning/reviews/documentation.md
 D .planning/reviews/error-handling.md
 D .planning/reviews/fixes-applied.md
 M .planning/reviews/glm.md
 M .planning/reviews/kimi.md
 M .planning/reviews/minimax.md
 D .planning/reviews/quality-patterns.md
 D .planning/reviews/security.md
 D .planning/reviews/task-spec.md
 D .planning/reviews/test-coverage.md
 D .planning/reviews/type-safety.md
 M AGENTS.md
 M ARCHITECTURE.md
 M CLAUDE.md
 M Cargo.toml

thinking
**Assessing large code diff**

I'm planning to analyze the large code diff focusing on modified and new files, excluding deleted ones for risk assessment, starting with an overview from git diff --stat and then inspecting key source files in detail.
thinking
**Assessing large code diff**

I'm planning to analyze the large code diff focusing on modified and new files, excluding deleted ones for risk assessment, starting with an overview from git diff --stat and then inspecting key source files in detail.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff --stat' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 49ms:
 .planning/STATE.json                               |   95 +-
 .planning/reviews/build.md                         |   96 --
 .planning/reviews/code-quality.md                  |  363 ------
 .planning/reviews/codex.md                         |  213 +---
 .planning/reviews/complexity.md                    |  270 ----
 .planning/reviews/documentation.md                 |  243 ----
 .planning/reviews/error-handling.md                |  120 --
 .planning/reviews/fixes-applied.md                 |  153 ---
 .planning/reviews/glm.md                           |  120 --
 .planning/reviews/kimi.md                          |  237 ----
 .planning/reviews/minimax.md                       |  116 --
 .planning/reviews/quality-patterns.md              |  306 -----
 .planning/reviews/security.md                      |  217 ----
 .planning/reviews/task-spec.md                     |  195 ---
 .planning/reviews/test-coverage.md                 |  314 -----
 .planning/reviews/type-safety.md                   |  412 ------
 AGENTS.md                                          |   81 +-
 ARCHITECTURE.md                                    |   16 +-
 CLAUDE.md                                          |   94 +-
 Cargo.toml                                         |   35 -


thinking
**Reviewing large deletions for bugs**

Inspecting major removals and refactors in key files to identify potential compile errors or logic bugs introduced by dropped modules and features, especially in src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs and src/lib.rs exports.
thinking
**Expanding review to multiple modified files**

Considering all changed files including untracked new modules like network_config.rs as part of code review to detect possible bugs, with focus starting on inspecting src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs diff.
thinking
**Reviewing large deletions for bugs**

Inspecting major removals and refactors in key files to identify potential compile errors or logic bugs introduced by dropped modules and features, especially in src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs and src/lib.rs exports.
thinking
**Expanding review to multiple modified files**

Considering all changed files including untracked new modules like network_config.rs as part of code review to detect possible bugs, with focus starting on inspecting src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs diff.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
diff --git a/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs b/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs
index 00efbfc..181335c 100644
--- a/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs
+++ b/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs
@@ -11,42 +11,203 @@
 // distributed under these licenses is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 
 //! DHT Integration for Adaptive Network
 //!
-//! This module bridges the existing S/Kademlia implementation with the adaptive
+//! This module bridges the existing DHT implementation with the adaptive
 //! network, providing trust-weighted routing and integration with other adaptive
 //! components.
 
+use super::som::NodeFeatures;
 use super::*;
-use crate::dht::skademlia::{SKademlia, SKademliaConfig};
-use crate::dht::{DHT, DHTConfig, DhtKey, Key as DHTKey};
-use crate::{Multiaddr, PeerId};

thinking
**Spotting remote node public key misuse**

The code incorrectly assigns the local node's public key to all remote node descriptors, which likely leads to confusion or errors when identifying or authenticating remote nodes. Next, I'll verify how NodeDescriptor uses this key to confirm the impact.
thinking
**Spotting remote node public key misuse**

The code incorrectly assigns the local node's public key to all remote node descriptors, which likely leads to confusion or errors when identifying or authenticating remote nodes. Next, I'll verify how NodeDescriptor uses this key to confirm the impact.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "struct NodeDescriptor" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 146ms:
src/adaptive/mod.rs:188:pub struct NodeDescriptor {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '160,240p' src/adaptive/mod.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
        } else {
            let hashed = blake3::hash(data);
            hash.copy_from_slice(hashed.as_bytes());
        }
        Self(hash)
    }
}

/// Network message type
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkMessage {
    /// Message ID
    pub id: String,
    /// Sender node ID
    pub sender: NodeId,
    /// Message content
    pub content: Vec<u8>,
    /// Message type
    pub msg_type: ContentType,
    /// Timestamp (Unix timestamp in seconds)

thinking
**Identifying potential public_key misuse**

NodeDescriptor fills all nodes with the local public_key, likely causing connection or signature errors if used for establishing remote connections; I'll investigate usages to confirm its role next.
thinking
**Identifying potential public_key misuse**

NodeDescriptor fills all nodes with the local public_key, likely causing connection or signature errors if used for establishing remote connections; I'll investigate usages to confirm its role next.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "public_key" src/adaptive src -S' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 29ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:815:        let public_key = self.identity.public_key().clone();
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:823:                    public_key: public_key.clone(),
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:815:        let public_key = self.identity.public_key().clone();
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:823:                    public_key: public_key.clone(),
src/adaptive/mod.rs:191:    pub public_key: crate::quantum_crypto::ant_quic_integration::MlDsaPublicKey,
src/adaptive/identity.rs:96:    pub fn public_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
src/adaptive/identity.rs:97:        self.inner.public_key().as_bytes()
src/adaptive/identity.rs:137:    pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
src/adaptive/identity.rs:147:            public_key: identity.signing_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),
src/adaptive/identity.rs:157:            public_key: self.public_key.clone(),
src/adaptive/identity.rs:174:        let computed_id = NodeIdentity::compute_node_id(&identity.public_key());
src/adaptive/identity.rs:199:        assert!(signed.verify(&identity.public_key()).unwrap());
src/adaptive/identity.rs:203:        assert!(!signed.verify(&other_identity.public_key()).unwrap());
src/adaptive/identity.rs:222:            identity.public_key().to_bytes(),
src/adaptive/identity.rs:223:            restored.public_key().to_bytes()
src/adaptive/mod.rs:191:    pub public_key: crate::quantum_crypto::ant_quic_integration::MlDsaPublicKey,
src/adaptive/identity.rs:96:    pub fn public_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
src/adaptive/identity.rs:97:        self.inner.public_key().as_bytes()
src/adaptive/identity.rs:137:    pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
src/adaptive/identity.rs:147:            public_key: identity.signing_key.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec(),

thinking
**Assessing public_key usage in routing**

The only new usage of public_key is in dht_integration, where it incorrectly uses the local identity's key for remote nodes. I'll check how NodeDescriptor is used in AdaptiveRouter or AdaptiveNetwork to confirm the impact on routing logic.
thinking
**Assessing public_key usage in routing**

The only new usage of public_key is in dht_integration, where it incorrectly uses the local identity's key for remote nodes. I'll check how NodeDescriptor is used in AdaptiveRouter or AdaptiveNetwork to confirm the impact on routing logic.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "find_closest_nodes" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 24ms:
src/adaptive/routing.rs:482:    async fn find_closest_nodes(
src/adaptive/replication.rs:171:                .find_closest_nodes(_content_hash, count * 2)
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:613:                .find_closest_nodes(key, count)
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:807:    pub async fn find_closest_nodes(
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:888:        let nodes = self.dht.find_closest_nodes(target, 3).await?;
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:267:            .find_closest_nodes(content_hash, 3)
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:339:        let nodes = som_strategy.find_closest_nodes(content_hash, 10).await?;
src/dht_network_manager.rs:500:            .find_closest_nodes(&key, self.config.replication_factor)
src/dht_network_manager.rs:504:            "find_closest_nodes returned {} nodes for key: {}",
src/dht_network_manager.rs:695:            .find_closest_nodes(key, self.config.replication_factor)
src/dht_network_manager.rs:761:            .find_closest_nodes(key, self.config.replication_factor * 2)
src/dht_network_manager.rs:886:    pub async fn find_closest_nodes(&self, key: &Key, count: usize) -> Result<Vec<DHTNode>> {
src/adaptive/mod.rs:270:    async fn find_closest_nodes(
src/dht/core_engine.rs:182:    fn find_closest_nodes(&self, key: &DhtKey, count: usize) -> Vec<NodeInfo> {
src/dht/core_engine.rs:604:        // ... (find_closest_nodes)
src/dht/core_engine.rs:605:        let target_nodes = routing.find_closest_nodes(key, 8);
src/dht/core_engine.rs:637:        let _closest_nodes = routing.find_closest_nodes(key, 8);
src/dht/core_engine.rs:647:        Ok(routing.find_closest_nodes(key, count))
src/dht/trust_weighted_kademlia.rs:257:    async fn find_closest_nodes(&self, target: &NodeId, k: usize) -> Vec<Contact> {
src/dht/trust_weighted_kademlia.rs:423:        let closest = self.find_closest_nodes(&target, self.k).await;

thinking
**Identifying potential security bug usage**

I found that NodeDescriptor’s public key is accessed in adaptive/security, suggesting it’s used for verification. This raises a concern that if find_closest_nodes returns a local NodeDescriptor mistakenly, security checks could misidentify nodes and cause verification errors or vulnerabilities. I’ll inspect usage around adaptive/security.rs line 688 to confirm this.
thinking
**Identifying potential security bug usage**

I found that NodeDescriptor’s public key is accessed in adaptive/security, suggesting it’s used for verification. This raises a concern that if find_closest_nodes returns a local NodeDescriptor mistakenly, security checks could misidentify nodes and cause verification errors or vulnerabilities. I’ll inspect usage around adaptive/security.rs line 688 to confirm this.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '650,730p' src/adaptive/security.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
            } else {
                return Err(SecurityError::InvalidSignature);
            }
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    /// Blacklist a node
    pub async fn blacklist_node(&self, node_id: NodeId, reason: BlacklistReason) {
        self.blacklist
            .add_entry(node_id.clone(), reason.clone())
            .await;

        self.auditor
            .log_event(
                SecurityEvent::NodeBlacklisted,
                Some(node_id),
                format!("Node blacklisted: {reason:?}"),
                Severity::Warning,

thinking
**Flagging ID vs public key mismatch**

I identified a critical discrepancy where verify_identity compares node IDs to a hash of the public key, but find_closest_nodes uses the local public key as the ID, which can cause verify_identity to fail improperly and potentially break security checks. Next, I'll examine where and how verify_identity is used to assess impact.
thinking
**Flagging ID vs public key mismatch**

I identified a critical discrepancy where verify_identity compares node IDs to a hash of the public key, but find_closest_nodes uses the local public key as the ID, which can cause verify_identity to fail improperly and potentially break security checks. Next, I'll examine where and how verify_identity is used to assess impact.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "verify_identity" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 22ms:
src/adaptive/security.rs:507:        if !self.verify_identity(node).await {
src/adaptive/security.rs:686:    async fn verify_identity(&self, node: &NodeDescriptor) -> bool {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '470,530p' src/adaptive/security.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
            blacklist,
            eclipse_detector,
            integrity_verifier,
            auditor,
            _identity: identity.to_user_id(),
        }
    }

    /// Validate node join request
    pub async fn validate_node_join(&self, node: &NodeDescriptor) -> Result<(), SecurityError> {
        // Check blacklist
        if self.blacklist.is_blacklisted(&node.id).await {
            self.auditor
                .log_event(
                    SecurityEvent::NodeBlacklisted,
                    Some(node.id.clone()),
                    "Node attempted to join while blacklisted".to_string(),
                    Severity::Warning,
                )
                .await;

thinking
**Investigating join node validation**

I'm analyzing how join uses NodeDescriptor and security checks, noting that using local public key for remote NodeDescriptor could fail identity verification; next, I'll examine join logic in adaptive/coordinator.rs, especially around security.validate_node_join.
thinking
**Investigating join node validation**

I'm analyzing how join uses NodeDescriptor and security checks, noting that using local public key for remote NodeDescriptor could fail identity verification; next, I'll examine join logic in adaptive/coordinator.rs, especially around security.validate_node_join.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "validate_node_join" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 22ms:
src/adaptive/security.rs:479:    pub async fn validate_node_join(&self, node: &NodeDescriptor) -> Result<(), SecurityError> {
src/adaptive/security.rs:1407:        assert!(manager.validate_node_join(&node).await.is_ok());
src/adaptive/security.rs:1416:            manager.validate_node_join(&node).await,

thinking
**Investigating NodeDescriptor usage in join**

I'm searching for where NodeDescriptor instances are created or consumed in the join process, focusing on implementations of join functions in the network module.
thinking
**Investigating NodeDescriptor usage in join**

I'm searching for where NodeDescriptor instances are created or consumed in the join process, focusing on implementations of join functions in the network module.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"fn join\\(\" -S src/adaptive" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
src/adaptive/mod.rs:218:    async fn join(&mut self, bootstrap: Vec<NodeDescriptor>) -> Result<()>;

thinking
**Searching for implementation of join method**

I'm searching within the src directory, focusing on the network folder and looking for occurrences of the join method with a mutable self argument to locate its implementation.
thinking
**Searching for implementation of join method**

I'm searching within the src directory, focusing on the network folder and looking for occurrences of the join method with a mutable self argument to locate its implementation.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"join\\(&mut self\" -S src" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 28ms:
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:268:    fn record_join(&mut self, peer: NodeId) {
src/adaptive/mod.rs:218:    async fn join(&mut self, bootstrap: Vec<NodeDescriptor>) -> Result<()>;
src/dht/node_age_verifier.rs:215:    pub fn record_rejoin(&mut self) {
src/dht/sybil_detector.rs:294:    pub fn record_join(&mut self, peer_id: PeerId, ip_addr: Option<IpAddr>) {


thinking
**Analyzing public key handling inconsistency**

I found the old code generated a new keypair or fallback dummy bytes per node with NodeId from node.id bytes, which mismatched the public key and likely caused identity verification to fail; this inconsistency suggests the patch may have introduced or exposed a bug in verifying identities.
thinking
**Confirming pre-existing identity mismatch bug**

The public key mismatch in NodeDescriptor existed before, but now using the local key instead of per-node random keys may cause identical public keys for all nodes, possibly breaking cryptographic checks or causing confusion; this might exacerbate issues though not newly introduced, so next I'll check related diffs in DHT network manager for clearer impact.
thinking
**Analyzing public key handling inconsistency**

I found the old code generated a new keypair or fallback dummy bytes per node with NodeId from node.id bytes, which mismatched the public key and likely caused identity verification to fail; this inconsistency suggests the patch may have introduced or exposed a bug in verifying identities.
thinking
**Confirming pre-existing identity mismatch bug**

The public key mismatch in NodeDescriptor existed before, but now using the local key instead of per-node random keys may cause identical public keys for all nodes, possibly breaking cryptographic checks or causing confusion; this might exacerbate issues though not newly introduced, so next I'll check related diffs in DHT network manager for clearer impact.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht_network_manager.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
diff --git a/src/dht_network_manager.rs b/src/dht_network_manager.rs
index 83fa9bb..c883586 100644
--- a/src/dht_network_manager.rs
+++ b/src/dht_network_manager.rs
@@ -199,10 +199,12 @@ pub struct DhtNetworkManager {
     stats: Arc<RwLock<DhtNetworkStats>>,
     /// Maintenance scheduler for periodic security and DHT tasks
     maintenance_scheduler: Arc<RwLock<MaintenanceScheduler>>,
     /// Semaphore for limiting concurrent message handlers (backpressure)
     message_handler_semaphore: Arc<Semaphore>,
+    /// Whether this manager owns the P2P node lifecycle
+    manage_node_lifecycle: bool,
 }
 
 /// DHT operation context
 ///
 /// Uses oneshot channel for response delivery to eliminate TOCTOU races.
@@ -368,25 +370,88 @@ impl DhtNetworkManager {
             event_tx,
             dht_peers: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),


thinking
**Spotting potential key derivation and PeerId mapping issues**

I identified a possible bug where `new_with_node` computes the DHT key by copying a prefix of peer ID bytes but zeroing out the rest, which might mismatch the actual peer hash, warranting a comparison with the old `new` method. Also, there's a concern that local backend node ID strings may not correctly map to proper PeerId types in `candidate_nodes`.
thinking
**Clarifying PeerId and NodeInfo types**

I'm verifying that `PeerId` might be aliased to `String` or libp2p’s type, noting `to_string()` conversions on NodeInfo’s ID, which may actually be a `NodeId`. Next, I’ll check the DHT core engine’s NodeInfo definition to confirm its ID type for accurate mapping.
thinking
**Spotting potential key derivation and PeerId mapping issues**

I identified a possible bug where `new_with_node` computes the DHT key by copying a prefix of peer ID bytes but zeroing out the rest, which might mismatch the actual peer hash, warranting a comparison with the old `new` method. Also, there's a concern that local backend node ID strings may not correctly map to proper PeerId types in `candidate_nodes`.
thinking
**Clarifying PeerId and NodeInfo types**

I'm verifying that `PeerId` might be aliased to `String` or libp2p’s type, noting `to_string()` conversions on NodeInfo’s ID, which may actually be a `NodeId`. Next, I’ll check the DHT core engine’s NodeInfo definition to confirm its ID type for accurate mapping.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "struct NodeInfo" -S src/dht' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 24ms:
src/dht/core_engine.rs:94:pub struct NodeInfo {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '80,130p' src/dht/core_engine.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 25ms:
    /// Get the underlying bytes
    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32] {
        self.0.as_bytes()
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Display for NodeId {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        write!(f, "{}", hex::encode(self.as_bytes()))
    }
}

/// Node information for routing
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeInfo {
    pub id: NodeId,
    pub address: String,
    pub last_seen: SystemTime,
    pub capacity: NodeCapacity,
}

thinking
**Inspecting PeerId origin**

I'm verifying the actual PeerId type to confirm if it aligns with the crate's `peer_record::UserId` or comes from another source. Next, I'll search the crate root to clarify its definition.
thinking
**Inspecting PeerId origin**

I'm verifying the actual PeerId type to confirm if it aligns with the crate's `peer_record::UserId` or comes from another source. Next, I'll search the crate root to clarify its definition.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "type PeerId" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
src/lib.rs:327:pub type PeerId = String;
src/types.rs:29:/// This demonstrates how `pub type PeerId = String` should eventually
src/dht/enhanced_storage_test.rs:24:pub type PeerId = String;
src/dht/trust_weighted_dht.rs:14:pub type PeerId = NodeId;
src/dht/trust_weighted_kademlia.rs:38:pub type PeerId = NodeId;


thinking
**Identifying potential error handling regression**

Noted that the new `get` method calls `router.route().await` but ignores its error, unlike the prior `retrieve` method which propagated it; this may weaken error detection but isn't necessarily a bug.
thinking
**Noticing missing metrics update on early local hits**

The `get` method returns early on local backend hits without updating success or hops metrics, introducing a minor but valid inconsistency that could mislead monitoring.
thinking
**Identifying potential error handling regression**

Noted that the new `get` method calls `router.route().await` but ignores its error, unlike the prior `retrieve` method which propagated it; this may weaken error detection but isn't necessarily a bug.
thinking
**Noticing missing metrics update on early local hits**

The `get` method returns early on local backend hits without updating success or hops metrics, introducing a minor but valid inconsistency that could mislead monitoring.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/adaptive/routing.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 166ms:
diff --git a/src/adaptive/routing.rs b/src/adaptive/routing.rs
index 86fecb8..ce3080d 100644
--- a/src/adaptive/routing.rs
+++ b/src/adaptive/routing.rs
@@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ impl RoutingStats {
 pub struct AdaptiveRouter {
     /// Local node ID
     _local_id: NodeId,
 
     /// Routing strategies
-    strategies: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<StrategyChoice, Box<dyn RoutingStrategy>>>>,
+    strategies: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<StrategyChoice, Arc<dyn RoutingStrategy>>>>,
 
     /// Multi-armed bandit for strategy selection
     bandit: Arc<RwLock<ThompsonSampling>>,
 
     /// Metrics collector
@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ impl AdaptiveRouter {
 
     /// Register a routing strategy

thinking
**Investigating changed return type**

Noticed that get_local now returns Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> instead of Option, though the method name is unchanged; I'll search for call sites relying on the old Option return to update them accordingly.
thinking
**Investigating changed return type**

Noticed that get_local now returns Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> instead of Option, though the method name is unchanged; I'll search for call sites relying on the old Option return to update them accordingly.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"get_local\\(\" -S src" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 140ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:720:                if let Ok(Some(value)) = manager.get_local(&key).await {
src/dht_network_manager.rs:613:    pub(crate) async fn get_local(&self, key: &Key) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {

thinking
**Inspecting related diffs for bugs**
thinking
**Inspecting related diffs for bugs**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/network.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 33ms:
diff --git a/src/network.rs b/src/network.rs
index 999cc30..2415e17 100644
--- a/src/network.rs
+++ b/src/network.rs
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@ use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::sync::{RwLock, broadcast};
 use tokio::time::{Instant, interval};
-use tracing::{debug, error, info, trace, warn};
+use tracing::{debug, info, trace, warn};
 
 /// Wire protocol message format for P2P communication.
 ///
 /// Serialized with bincode for compact binary encoding.
 /// Replaces the previous JSON format for better performance
@@ -110,17 +110,10 @@ pub struct NodeConfig {
     ///
     /// When set, this configuration is used by bootstrap peer discovery and

thinking
**Inspecting DHT handler changes**

I'm focusing on recent changes in the DHT handler to check if the network backend or lifecycle management might have introduced a bug linked to the new adaptive DHT backend integration.
thinking
**Inspecting DHT handler changes**

I'm focusing on recent changes in the DHT handler to check if the network backend or lifecycle management might have introduced a bug linked to the new adaptive DHT backend integration.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/transport/dht_handler.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 28ms:
diff --git a/src/transport/dht_handler.rs b/src/transport/dht_handler.rs
index 523f1b7..e8c0ae0 100644
--- a/src/transport/dht_handler.rs
+++ b/src/transport/dht_handler.rs
@@ -16,11 +16,11 @@
 //!
 //! | Type | Byte | Purpose |
 //! |------|------|---------|
 //! | DhtQuery | 0x10 | GET, FIND_NODE, FIND_VALUE requests |
 //! | DhtStore | 0x11 | PUT, STORE requests with data |
-//! | DhtWitness | 0x12 | Witness requests for BFT |
+//! | DhtWitness | 0x12 | (removed) |
 //! | DhtReplication | 0x13 | Background replication traffic |
 
 use ant_quic::link_transport::{LinkError, LinkResult, ProtocolHandler, StreamType};
 use ant_quic::nat_traversal_api::PeerId;
 use async_trait::async_trait;
@@ -30,26 +30,25 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 use tracing::{debug, error, trace, warn};

thinking
**Reviewing witness removal impact on response types**

Noticed potential inconsistency where witness receipt removal may not align with expected DhtResponse::StoreAck type; next is to check the network integration diff to confirm matching DhtResponse fields.
thinking
**Reviewing witness removal impact on response types**

Noticed potential inconsistency where witness receipt removal may not align with expected DhtResponse::StoreAck type; next is to check the network integration diff to confirm matching DhtResponse fields.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/network_integration.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 28ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/network_integration.rs b/src/dht/network_integration.rs
index cf02582..fd32445 100644
--- a/src/dht/network_integration.rs
+++ b/src/dht/network_integration.rs
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
 //! Network Integration Layer for DHT v2
 //!
 //! Bridges DHT operations with saorsa-core transport infrastructure, providing
 //! efficient protocol handling, connection management, and network optimization.
 
-use crate::dht::{
-    core_engine::{ConsistencyLevel, DhtCoreEngine, DhtKey, NodeCapacity, NodeId, NodeInfo},
-    witness::{OperationId, WitnessReceipt},
+use crate::dht::core_engine::{
+    ConsistencyLevel, DhtCoreEngine, DhtKey, NodeCapacity, NodeId, NodeInfo,
 };
 use anyhow::{Result, anyhow};
 use lru::LruCache;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::{HashMap, VecDeque};


thinking
**Reviewing potential bugs in DHT adaptive integration**

Evaluated several candidate areas for bugs including coordinate storage, candidate node handling, and local backend ID conversions; none seem immediately problematic. Still suspect configuration mismatches in the new AdaptiveDhtConfig and its interaction with network backend and target selection logic. Next step is closely examining changes in trust and hyperbolic modules for subtle issues.
thinking
**Identifying major store-retrieve key mismatch bug**

Discovered that store uses a derived DHT key (blake3 or original key) to save data but returns a content hash (sha256 of key+value) used as retrieval key. Retrieval uses this content hash directly as DHT key, causing fetch failures since stored data lives under a different key. This is a critical mismatch likely causing retrieval to always fail.
thinking
**Reviewing potential bugs in DHT adaptive integration**

Evaluated several candidate areas for bugs including coordinate storage, candidate node handling, and local backend ID conversions; none seem immediately problematic. Still suspect configuration mismatches in the new AdaptiveDhtConfig and its interaction with network backend and target selection logic. Next step is closely examining changes in trust and hyperbolic modules for subtle issues.
thinking
**Identifying major store-retrieve key mismatch bug**

Discovered that store uses a derived DHT key (blake3 or original key) to save data but returns a content hash (sha256 of key+value) used as retrieval key. Retrieval uses this content hash directly as DHT key, causing fetch failures since stored data lives under a different key. This is a critical mismatch likely causing retrieval to always fail.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"AdaptiveDHT::store|\\.store\\(\" -S src/adaptive" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 33ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:662:                .store(&DhtKey::from_bytes(key), value)
src/adaptive/storage.rs:513:        let hash = store.store(content.clone(), metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/storage.rs:575:        let hash = store.store(content.clone(), metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:505:            .store(content.clone(), metadata)
src/adaptive/storage_integration_test.rs:87:        store.store(content.clone(), metadata.clone()).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/storage_integration_test.rs:124:            store.store(chunk.data.clone(), chunk_metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/storage_integration_test.rs:156:        store.store(content.clone(), metadata.clone()).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/storage_integration_test.rs:208:        store.store(content.clone(), metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/storage_integration_test.rs:292:            store.store(content.clone(), metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions_tests.rs:169:        store.store(data, metadata).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:694:            .store(data.clone(), metadata)
src/adaptive/client.rs:584:            .store(data.clone(), metadata.clone())
src/adaptive/client.rs:935:        let hash = client.store(data.clone()).await.unwrap();
src/adaptive/client.rs:947:        let result = client.store(vec![1, 2, 3]).await;
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs:71:        let _ = self.store(data.to_vec(), metadata).await.map_err(|e| {

thinking
**Investigating AdaptiveDHT store usage**

I'm searching for direct calls to AdaptiveDHT's store method within adaptive-related modules to understand how and where metadata storage occurs in the codebase.
thinking
**Investigating AdaptiveDHT store usage**

I'm searching for direct calls to AdaptiveDHT's store method within adaptive-related modules to understand how and where metadata storage occurs in the codebase.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"dht\\.store\" -S src/adaptive" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core exited 1 in 24ms:


thinking
**Checking AdaptiveNetworkNode implementations**
thinking
**Checking AdaptiveNetworkNode implementations**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "AdaptiveNetworkNode" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 22ms:
src/adaptive/mod.rs:216:pub trait AdaptiveNetworkNode: Send + Sync {

thinking
**Searching for adaptive network impl**

I'm looking for an implementation of the AdaptiveNetworkNode trait, focusing on AdaptiveNetworkCoordinator in the coordinator.rs file to understand its role.
thinking
**Searching for adaptive network impl**

I'm looking for an implementation of the AdaptiveNetworkNode trait, focusing on AdaptiveNetworkCoordinator in the coordinator.rs file to understand its role.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "impl .*AdaptiveNetworkNode" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core exited 1 in 66ms:



thinking
**Analyzing potential misuses in DHT storage and identity handling**

I'm verifying that `AdaptiveDHT::store` may be unused and that removed code implies architecture changes avoiding general store/retrieve methods. I’m also considering that using the local identity’s public key for remote nodes in `find_closest_nodes` could break identity verification but might be intentional since `NodeDescriptor` may serve routing heuristics rather than strict security checks. Next, I'll check `adaptive/security.rs` tests to confirm this behavior.
thinking
**Spotting potential lifecycle management issue**

I noticed that the new `AdaptiveDHT::attach_to_node` starts a `DhtNetworkManager` but doesn't stop it when `AdaptiveDHT` is dropped, which could cause resource leaks; this might be new due to the architecture change. Next, I'll review related files for more logic changes and check core engine diffs for clearer bugs.
thinking
**Analyzing potential misuses in DHT storage and identity handling**

I'm verifying that `AdaptiveDHT::store` may be unused and that removed code implies architecture changes avoiding general store/retrieve methods. I’m also considering that using the local identity’s public key for remote nodes in `find_closest_nodes` could break identity verification but might be intentional since `NodeDescriptor` may serve routing heuristics rather than strict security checks. Next, I'll check `adaptive/security.rs` tests to confirm this behavior.
thinking
**Spotting potential lifecycle management issue**

I noticed that the new `AdaptiveDHT::attach_to_node` starts a `DhtNetworkManager` but doesn't stop it when `AdaptiveDHT` is dropped, which could cause resource leaks; this might be new due to the architecture change. Next, I'll review related files for more logic changes and check core engine diffs for clearer bugs.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/core_engine.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 25ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/core_engine.rs b/src/dht/core_engine.rs
index a4434d2..33b800b 100644
--- a/src/dht/core_engine.rs
+++ b/src/dht/core_engine.rs
@@ -1,21 +1,19 @@
 //! Enhanced DHT Core Engine with Kademlia routing and intelligent data distribution
 //!
 //! Provides the main DHT functionality with k=8 replication, load balancing, and fault tolerance.
 
 use crate::dht::{
-    content_addressing::ContentAddress,
     geographic_routing::GeographicRegion,
     metrics::SecurityMetricsCollector,
     routing_maintenance::{
         BucketRefreshManager, EvictionManager, EvictionReason, MaintenanceConfig,
         close_group_validator::{
             CloseGroupFailure, CloseGroupValidator, CloseGroupValidatorConfig,
         },
-        data_integrity_monitor::DataIntegrityMonitor,
     },

thinking
**Identifying new network config file**

A new network config file appeared in transport, replacing a removed messaging network config; it likely supports DHT networking, so I'll review it next.
thinking
**Identifying new network config file**

A new network config file appeared in transport, replacing a removed messaging network config; it likely supports DHT networking, so I'll review it next.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '1,200p' src/transport/network_config.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
// Network configuration types for MessagingService
//
// This module provides flexible port configuration options to support:
// - OS-assigned random ports (port 0)
// - Explicit port selection
// - Port range selection with fallback
// - IPv4/IPv6 mode configuration
// - Multiple instances on the same machine
// - P2P NAT traversal configuration

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

// Import ant-quic NAT config type (unified config in 0.14+)
use ant_quic::NatConfig;

/// Configuration for network port binding
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkConfig {
    /// Port configuration for networking
    pub port: PortConfig,
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '200,400p' src/transport/network_config.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
    /// Create configuration with P2P NAT traversal
    pub fn p2p_node(concurrency_limit: u32) -> Self {
        Self {
            nat_traversal: Some(NatTraversalMode::P2PNode { concurrency_limit }),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    /// Create configuration with client-only NAT traversal
    pub fn client_only() -> Self {
        Self {
            nat_traversal: Some(NatTraversalMode::ClientOnly),
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }

    /// Create configuration with NAT traversal disabled
    pub fn no_nat_traversal() -> Self {
        Self {
            nat_traversal: None,

thinking
**Noticing untracked new module with potential inclusion gap**

The untracked file defines a new module that uses `NatConfig` but may not be included in the build since it's not declared in mods; I'll verify if related module declarations or imports were added elsewhere, especially in `src/transport.rs`.
thinking
**Noticing untracked new module with potential inclusion gap**

The untracked file defines a new module that uses `NatConfig` but may not be included in the build since it's not declared in mods; I'll verify if related module declarations or imports were added elsewhere, especially in `src/transport.rs`.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/transport.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 29ms:
diff --git a/src/transport.rs b/src/transport.rs
index 3f89140..b2808bb 100644
--- a/src/transport.rs
+++ b/src/transport.rs
@@ -21,10 +21,15 @@
 pub mod ant_quic_adapter;
 
 // DHT protocol handler for SharedTransport integration
 pub mod dht_handler;
 
+// Network binding and NAT traversal configuration (moved from messaging)
+pub mod network_config;
+
+pub use network_config::{IpMode, NatTraversalMode, NetworkConfig, PortConfig, RetryBehavior};
+
 use crate::validation::{Validate, ValidationContext, validate_message_size, validate_peer_id};
 use crate::{P2PError, PeerId, Result};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 use std::fmt;

thinking
**Analyzing access changes and usage**

I'm checking if changed visibility of store/get methods affects usage in coordinator, focusing on whether they're still called properly or cause missing references, which might reveal the real bug beyond missing untracked files.
thinking
**Analyzing access changes and usage**

I'm checking if changed visibility of store/get methods affects usage in coordinator, focusing on whether they're still called properly or cause missing references, which might reveal the real bug beyond missing untracked files.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"store\\(&self\" -n src/adaptive/coordinator.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 20ms:
224:    pub fn content_store(&self) -> &Arc<ContentStore> {
677:    pub async fn store(&self, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<ContentHash> {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '660,730p' src/adaptive/coordinator.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
        self.routing.trust_engine.start_computation().await?;

        // Join gossip mesh
        self.network.gossip.start().await?;

        // Start monitoring
        self.operations.monitoring.start_collection().await?;

        // Update state
        let mut state = self.state.write().await;
        state.joined = true;

        info!("Successfully joined P2P network");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Store data in the network
    pub async fn store(&self, data: Vec<u8>) -> Result<ContentHash> {
        // Security check
        self.operations

thinking
**Questioning usage of DHT store**

The adaptive coordinator uses storage replication for store/retrieve, not the DHT store, making the DHT store functions potentially unused or incidental within the crate API. I'll verify actual usage of AdaptiveDHT methods in the codebase to confirm if this is a non-issue or a latent bug.
thinking
**Questioning usage of DHT store**

The adaptive coordinator uses storage replication for store/retrieve, not the DHT store, making the DHT store functions potentially unused or incidental within the crate API. I'll verify actual usage of AdaptiveDHT methods in the codebase to confirm if this is a non-issue or a latent bug.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "AdaptiveDHT" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:138:/// Dependencies required for AdaptiveDHT.
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:198:pub struct AdaptiveDHT {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:251:impl AdaptiveDHT {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:294:    /// Attach AdaptiveDHT to an existing P2P node using a network backend.
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:879:    dht: Arc<AdaptiveDHT>,
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:883:    pub fn new(dht: Arc<AdaptiveDHT>) -> Self {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:896:        AdaptiveDHT::xor_distance_score(neighbor, target)
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:900:        // Metrics updated in AdaptiveDHT
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:931:        let dht = AdaptiveDHT::new(
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:953:        let key = AdaptiveDHT::node_id_to_key(&node_id);
src/adaptive/mod.rs:66:    AdaptiveDHT, AdaptiveDhtConfig, AdaptiveDhtDependencies, KademliaRoutingStrategy,
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:31:    AdaptiveDHTExtensions, AdaptiveGossipSubExtensions, AdaptiveRouterExtensions,
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:69:    pub dht: Arc<AdaptiveDHT>,
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:189:    pub fn dht(&self) -> &Arc<AdaptiveDHT> {
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:421:        // Initialize ML components early so AdaptiveDHT can use the same predictors
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:435:            AdaptiveDHT::new_with_dependencies(
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs:280:// Extension trait for AdaptiveDHT
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs:281:pub trait AdaptiveDHTExtensions {
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs:285:impl AdaptiveDHTExtensions for AdaptiveDHT {
src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs:294:        // However, AdaptiveDHT would need bootstrap node configuration to implement this.

thinking
**Inspecting coordinator extensions**
thinking
**Inspecting coordinator extensions**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '260,340p' src/adaptive/coordinator_extensions.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
            .await
            .map_err(|e| P2PError::Internal(format!("Rate limit check failed: {}", e).into()))
    }

    async fn set_temporary_relaxation(&self, _duration: Duration) -> Result<()> {
        // Rate limit relaxation allows temporary increase in request limits
        // This would be useful during network recovery or high-demand periods
        // The underlying RateLimiter would need a relaxation multiplier field
        // For now, this is a no-op placeholder
        Ok(())
    }

    async fn enable_strict_rate_limiting(&self) -> Result<()> {
        // Strict rate limiting reduces limits to protect against attacks
        // The underlying RateLimiter would need a strict mode flag
        // For now, this is a no-op placeholder
        Ok(())
    }
}



thinking
**Identifying a key DHT identity mismatch**

Found that `AdaptiveDHT::find_closest_nodes` uses the local public key for node ID calculations, which mismatches NodeDescriptor IDs derived from peers' public keys—likely causing identity verification failures and rejection of candidate nodes, revealing a pre-existing bug in node identity handling.
thinking
**Assessing identity key use in new DHT code**

New DHT code applies the local public key for all nodes, which differs from prior random keys but still mismatches remote nodes' identities; however, identity verification usually relies on NodeDescriptors from remote handshakes, so this mismatch may not cause failures except possibly in retrieval or replication contexts.
thinking
**Identifying a key DHT identity mismatch**

Found that `AdaptiveDHT::find_closest_nodes` uses the local public key for node ID calculations, which mismatches NodeDescriptor IDs derived from peers' public keys—likely causing identity verification failures and rejection of candidate nodes, revealing a pre-existing bug in node identity handling.
thinking
**Assessing identity key use in new DHT code**

New DHT code applies the local public key for all nodes, which differs from prior random keys but still mismatches remote nodes' identities; however, identity verification usually relies on NodeDescriptors from remote handshakes, so this mismatch may not cause failures except possibly in retrieval or replication contexts.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "NodeDescriptor" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 22ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:815:    ) -> Result<Vec<NodeDescriptor>> {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:825:                NodeDescriptor {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:853:    pub async fn update_routing(&self, node: NodeDescriptor) -> Result<()> {
src/adaptive/mod.rs:188:pub struct NodeDescriptor {
src/adaptive/mod.rs:218:    async fn join(&mut self, bootstrap: Vec<NodeDescriptor>) -> Result<()>;
src/adaptive/mod.rs:236:    async fn node_info(&self) -> Result<NodeDescriptor>;
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:935:    pub async fn get_node_info(&self) -> Result<NodeDescriptor> {
src/adaptive/coordinator.rs:936:        Ok(NodeDescriptor {
src/adaptive/security.rs:479:    pub async fn validate_node_join(&self, node: &NodeDescriptor) -> Result<(), SecurityError> {
src/adaptive/security.rs:686:    async fn verify_identity(&self, node: &NodeDescriptor) -> bool {
src/adaptive/security.rs:1392:        let node = NodeDescriptor {


thinking
**Assessing potential bugs in DHT integration**

I've identified that `NodeDescriptor`'s local key misuse likely doesn't affect code, as routing mainly uses `NodeId`. I’m verifying suspicious spots in `dht_integration.rs`: replication factor logic defaults safely; candidate counts never multiply by zero; SOM scores don’t update but may be acceptable; sorting handles NaN safely since values are clamped; and region detection treats missing addresses as Unknown correctly.
thinking
**Examining candidate node reliability assignment**

I’m verifying if `DHTNode` actually has a reliability field, since `AdaptiveDHT::candidate_nodes` uses it when converting nodes from `find_closest_nodes`; this may indicate a bug if the field is missing. Other suspects like ignored errors on routing and storage appear non-critical.
thinking
**Assessing potential bugs in DHT integration**

I've identified that `NodeDescriptor`'s local key misuse likely doesn't affect code, as routing mainly uses `NodeId`. I’m verifying suspicious spots in `dht_integration.rs`: replication factor logic defaults safely; candidate counts never multiply by zero; SOM scores don’t update but may be acceptable; sorting handles NaN safely since values are clamped; and region detection treats missing addresses as Unknown correctly.
thinking
**Examining candidate node reliability assignment**

I’m verifying if `DHTNode` actually has a reliability field, since `AdaptiveDHT::candidate_nodes` uses it when converting nodes from `find_closest_nodes`; this may indicate a bug if the field is missing. Other suspects like ignored errors on routing and storage appear non-critical.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "struct DHTNode" -S src/dht_network_manager.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
45:pub struct DHTNode {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '1,80p' src/dht_network_manager.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
// Copyright 2024 Saorsa Labs Limited
//
// This software is dual-licensed under:
// - GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later (AGPL-3.0-or-later)
// - Commercial License
//
// For AGPL-3.0 license, see LICENSE-AGPL-3.0
// For commercial licensing, contact: david@saorsalabs.com
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under these licenses is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.

//! DHT Network Manager
//!
//! This module provides the integration layer between the DHT system and the network layer,
//! enabling real P2P operations with Kademlia routing over transport protocols.

#![allow(missing_docs)]



thinking
**Noting potential trust ID mismatch**

The trust provider uses NodeId derived from peer_id via blake3 hash, which may not always align with NodeIdentity's NodeId, risking zero trust entries unintentionally. This inconsistency could affect trust lookups but isn't definitively a bug.
thinking
**Identifying missing fallback in get method**

If candidate nodes are empty, AdaptiveDHT::get returns None instead of falling back to manager.get, causing retrieval failures when the routing table is unpopulated. This likely breaks retrieval at startup and differs from store's fallback behavior, marking a probable functional bug.
thinking
**Noting potential trust ID mismatch**

The trust provider uses NodeId derived from peer_id via blake3 hash, which may not always align with NodeIdentity's NodeId, risking zero trust entries unintentionally. This inconsistency could affect trust lookups but isn't definitively a bug.
thinking
**Identifying missing fallback in get method**

If candidate nodes are empty, AdaptiveDHT::get returns None instead of falling back to manager.get, causing retrieval failures when the routing table is unpopulated. This likely breaks retrieval at startup and differs from store's fallback behavior, marking a probable functional bug.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '500,650p' src/dht_network_manager.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 23ms:
        // Find closest nodes for replication
        let closest_nodes = self
            .find_closest_nodes(&key, self.config.replication_factor)
            .await?;

        debug!(
            "find_closest_nodes returned {} nodes for key: {}",
            closest_nodes.len(),
            hex::encode(key)
        );
        for (i, node) in closest_nodes.iter().enumerate() {
            trace!("  Node {}: peer_id={}", i, node.peer_id);
        }

        if closest_nodes.is_empty() {
            warn!(
                "No nodes found for key: {}, storing locally only",
                hex::encode(key)
            );
            // Store locally

thinking
**Evaluating scroll-to-get method**

Considering continuing with the scroll-to-get method to retrieve data or context.
thinking
**Evaluating scroll-to-get method**

Considering continuing with the scroll-to-get method to retrieve data or context.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '650,820p' src/dht_network_manager.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
            async move { (peer.clone(), self.send_dht_request(&peer, op).await) }
        });

        let results = futures::future::join_all(replication_futures).await;
        for (peer_id, result) in results {
            match result {
                Ok(DhtNetworkResult::PutSuccess { .. }) => {
                    replicated_count += 1;
                    debug!("Replicated to peer: {}", peer_id);
                }
                Ok(other) => {
                    debug!("Unexpected result from peer {}: {:?}", peer_id, other);
                }
                Err(e) => {
                    debug!("Failed to replicate to peer {}: {}", peer_id, e);
                }
            }
        }

        Ok(DhtNetworkResult::PutSuccess {

thinking
**Analyzing potential ID mismatches and trust integration**

Noticed possible mismatch where `AdaptiveDHT` uses peer ID hashes for NodeId, but the trust provider expects NodeId from NodeIdentity, risking trust lookups failing; also flagged a potential issue creating `DHT` with `NodeId` type possibly differing from expected, prompting inspection of the `DHT` definition to clarify type expectations.
thinking
**Analyzing potential ID mismatches and trust integration**

Noticed possible mismatch where `AdaptiveDHT` uses peer ID hashes for NodeId, but the trust provider expects NodeId from NodeIdentity, risking trust lookups failing; also flagged a potential issue creating `DHT` with `NodeId` type possibly differing from expected, prompting inspection of the `DHT` definition to clarify type expectations.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "pub struct DHT" -S src/dht' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 24ms:
src/dht/mod.rs:58:pub struct DHTConfig {
src/dht/performance_benchmark.rs:66:pub struct DHTPerformanceBenchmark {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '1,120p' src/dht/mod.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
//! Distributed Hash Table implementations
//!
//! This module provides various DHT implementations including:
//! - Trust-weighted Kademlia DHT with EigenTrust integration
//! - Core DHT engine with replication and fault tolerance
//! - Geographic routing and content addressing
//! - Capacity signaling and telemetry

pub mod capacity_signaling;
pub mod core_engine;
pub mod telemetry;
pub mod trust_weighted_dht;
pub mod trust_weighted_kademlia;

// Re-export the main DHT trait and types
pub use trust_weighted_dht::{
    Contact, Dht, Key, Outcome, PutPolicy, PutReceipt, eigen_trust_epoch, record_interaction,
};

// Re-export PeerId from trust_weighted_dht

thinking
**Inspecting UserId type for hash method**

I'm verifying if the UserId type (aliased as NodeId) has a hash method used in AdaptiveDHT's node_id_to_key to rule out potential bugs.
thinking
**Inspecting UserId type for hash method**

I'm verifying if the UserId type (aliased as NodeId) has a hash method used in AdaptiveDHT's node_id_to_key to rule out potential bugs.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "struct UserId" -S src/peer_record.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
57:pub struct UserId {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '50,80p' src/peer_record.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:

/// Default TTL for DHT records (5 minutes)
pub const DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS: u32 = 5 * 60;

/// Unique identifier for a user in the P2P network
/// Generated from public key hash to ensure uniqueness and prevent collisions
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserId {
    /// BLAKE3 hash of the user's public key
    pub hash: [u8; 32],
}

impl UserId {
    /// Create a new UserId from a public key
    pub fn from_public_key(public_key: &MlDsaPublicKey) -> Self {
        let hash = blake3::hash(public_key.as_bytes());
        Self { hash: hash.into() }
    }

    /// Create a UserId from raw bytes


thinking
**Analyzing potential NodeId and peer_id mismatches**

The UserId hash doubles as NodeId bytes in AdaptiveDHT, which risks mixing user IDs with DHT node IDs; this might cause subtle bugs in coordinate derivation and peer ID handling. Additionally, candidate node peer IDs use hex string conversions that may not align with expected peer ID formats, especially in local backend contexts. Next, I'll inspect HyperbolicSpace for compatibility and verify DhtNetworkManager's local peer ID logic.
thinking
**Confirming public_key misuse causing identity collisions**

Switching NodeDescriptor's public_key from random keys to a shared local key makes all nodes appear identical, likely causing map collisions and identity verification failures. This is a new, more severe bug affecting node differentiation and trust computations, especially if NodeDescriptor is exposed externally. I'll review trust provider implications and the node ID derivation inconsistencies from peer_id strings next.
thinking
**Analyzing potential NodeId and peer_id mismatches**

The UserId hash doubles as NodeId bytes in AdaptiveDHT, which risks mixing user IDs with DHT node IDs; this might cause subtle bugs in coordinate derivation and peer ID handling. Additionally, candidate node peer IDs use hex string conversions that may not align with expected peer ID formats, especially in local backend contexts. Next, I'll inspect HyperbolicSpace for compatibility and verify DhtNetworkManager's local peer ID logic.
thinking
**Confirming public_key misuse causing identity collisions**

Switching NodeDescriptor's public_key from random keys to a shared local key makes all nodes appear identical, likely causing map collisions and identity verification failures. This is a new, more severe bug affecting node differentiation and trust computations, especially if NodeDescriptor is exposed externally. I'll review trust provider implications and the node ID derivation inconsistencies from peer_id strings next.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "impl NodeId" -n src/dht/core_engine.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
65:impl NodeId {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '50,80p' src/dht/core_engine.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:

    /// XOR distance metric for Kademlia
    pub fn distance(&self, other: &DhtKey) -> [u8; 32] {
        let mut result = [0u8; 32];
        for (i, out) in result.iter_mut().enumerate() {
            *out = self.0[i] ^ other.0[i];
        }
        result
    }
}

/// Node identifier in the DHT
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NodeId(DhtKey);

impl NodeId {
    pub fn random() -> Self {
        let random_bytes: [u8; 32] = rand::random();
        Self(DhtKey::from_bytes(random_bytes))
    }

thinking
**Identifying NodeId and trust key mismatch**

DHT NodeId wraps user id bytes, but converting NodeInfo id to string then hashing produces a different NodeId, causing trust lookups to fail and default trust scores to be used. Next, I'll check the TrustProvider implementation to confirm its default behavior.
thinking
**Identifying NodeId and trust key mismatch**

DHT NodeId wraps user id bytes, but converting NodeInfo id to string then hashing produces a different NodeId, causing trust lookups to fail and default trust scores to be used. Next, I'll check the TrustProvider implementation to confirm its default behavior.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "trait TrustProvider|impl TrustProvider" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 41ms:
src/adaptive/trust.rs:414:impl TrustProvider for EigenTrustEngine {
src/adaptive/trust.rs:615:impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:808:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:847:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:891:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:957:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:1002:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/gossip.rs:1066:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/routing.rs:522:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:914:        impl TrustProvider for MockTrustProvider {
src/adaptive/mod.rs:288:pub trait TrustProvider: Send + Sync {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '280,340p' src/adaptive/mod.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 40ms:
    }
}

/// Trust provider trait for reputation queries
///
/// Provides a unified interface for trust scoring and management.
/// Implementations should maintain a global trust vector that can be
/// queried for individual nodes or in aggregate.
pub trait TrustProvider: Send + Sync {
    /// Get trust score for a node (0.0 = untrusted, 1.0 = fully trusted)
    fn get_trust(&self, node: &NodeId) -> f64;

    /// Update trust based on interaction outcome
    fn update_trust(&self, from: &NodeId, to: &NodeId, success: bool);

    /// Get global trust vector for all known nodes
    fn get_global_trust(&self) -> std::collections::HashMap<NodeId, f64>;

    /// Remove a node from the trust system
    fn remove_node(&self, node: &NodeId);

thinking
**Inspecting trust calculation in engine**

I'm checking the `EigenTrustEngine::get_trust` method around line 414 in `adaptive/trust.rs` to understand if it returns a default trust value like 0.5.
thinking
**Inspecting trust calculation in engine**

I'm checking the `EigenTrustEngine::get_trust` method around line 414 in `adaptive/trust.rs` to understand if it returns a default trust value like 0.5.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '380,450p' src/adaptive/trust.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
        let compute_factor = (1.0 + stats.compute_contributed as f64).ln() / 10.0;
        let uptime_factor = (stats.uptime as f64 / 86400.0).min(1.0); // Max 1 day

        // Weighted combination
        0.4 * response_rate
            + 0.2 * uptime_factor
            + 0.15 * storage_factor
            + 0.15 * bandwidth_factor
            + 0.1 * compute_factor
    }

    /// Add a pre-trusted node
    pub async fn add_pre_trusted(&self, node_id: NodeId) {
        let mut pre_trusted = self.pre_trusted_nodes.write().await;
        pre_trusted.insert(node_id.clone());

        // Update cache with high initial trust
        let mut cache = self.trust_cache.write().await;
        cache.insert(node_id, 0.9);
    }


thinking
**Analyzing trust and NodeId mapping mismatch**

Trust returns 0 for unknown nodes, effectively marking mis-mapped nodes as untrusted and degrading their selection weight; however, the DHT NodeId (from peer_id string bytes) may differ from NodeIdentity-based NodeId used by the trust provider, risking a mismatch that impacts trust updates and candidate scoring.
thinking
**Tracing trust update calls**

I'm checking where `update_node_stats` is called to see if it uses NodeId from identity or peer_id, which will clarify if there’s a NodeId mapping mismatch causing trust update issues.
thinking
**Analyzing trust and NodeId mapping mismatch**

Trust returns 0 for unknown nodes, effectively marking mis-mapped nodes as untrusted and degrading their selection weight; however, the DHT NodeId (from peer_id string bytes) may differ from NodeIdentity-based NodeId used by the trust provider, risking a mismatch that impacts trust updates and candidate scoring.
thinking
**Tracing trust update calls**

I'm checking where `update_node_stats` is called to see if it uses NodeId from identity or peer_id, which will clarify if there’s a NodeId mapping mismatch causing trust update issues.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "update_node_stats" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
src/adaptive/trust.rs:150:    pub async fn update_node_stats(&self, node_id: &NodeId, stats_update: NodeStatisticsUpdate) {
src/adaptive/trust.rs:737:            .update_node_stats(&node, NodeStatisticsUpdate::Uptime(3600))
src/adaptive/trust.rs:740:            .update_node_stats(&node, NodeStatisticsUpdate::CorrectResponse)
src/adaptive/trust.rs:743:            .update_node_stats(&node, NodeStatisticsUpdate::CorrectResponse)
src/adaptive/trust.rs:746:            .update_node_stats(&node, NodeStatisticsUpdate::FailedResponse)
src/adaptive/trust.rs:749:            .update_node_stats(&node, NodeStatisticsUpdate::StorageContributed(100))

thinking
**Assessing trust module impact and compilation risks**

I’m verifying if trust scores are effectively updated since the main update function might only be used in tests, which suggests trust values stay at zero in practice. I also noted possible bugs from removed attestation features still being referenced, risking compile failures, particularly after changes in security metrics, so I’ll check the diff to confirm.
thinking
**Assessing trust module impact and compilation risks**

I’m verifying if trust scores are effectively updated since the main update function might only be used in tests, which suggests trust values stay at zero in practice. I also noted possible bugs from removed attestation features still being referenced, risking compile failures, particularly after changes in security metrics, so I’ll check the diff to confirm.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/metrics/security_metrics.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 24ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/metrics/security_metrics.rs b/src/dht/metrics/security_metrics.rs
index fa5db3e..e7ce102 100644
--- a/src/dht/metrics/security_metrics.rs
+++ b/src/dht/metrics/security_metrics.rs
@@ -88,18 +88,10 @@ pub struct SecurityMetrics {
     /// Total nodes rejected due to geographic diversity limits
     pub geographic_diversity_rejections_total: u64,
     /// Node counts per geographic region
     pub nodes_per_region: HashMap<String, u64>,
 
-    // Data attestation challenge metrics
-    /// Total attestation challenges sent
-    pub attestation_challenges_sent_total: u64,
-    /// Total attestation challenges passed
-    pub attestation_challenges_passed_total: u64,
-    /// Total attestation challenges failed
-    pub attestation_challenges_failed_total: u64,
-
     // Trust threshold violation metrics
     /// Total trust threshold violations detected

thinking
**Inspecting eviction logic**
thinking
**Inspecting eviction logic**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/routing_maintenance/eviction.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 102ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/routing_maintenance/eviction.rs b/src/dht/routing_maintenance/eviction.rs
index a3ca8c4..c0f83ee 100644
--- a/src/dht/routing_maintenance/eviction.rs
+++ b/src/dht/routing_maintenance/eviction.rs
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 //! Reputation-based node eviction
 //!
 //! Manages eviction decisions based on:
 //! - Consecutive communication failures
 //! - Low trust scores (EigenTrust integration)
-//! - Failed data attestation challenges
+//! - Failed validation checks
 //!
 //! Copyright 2024 Saorsa Labs
 //! SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later OR Commercial
 
 use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -20,12 +20,10 @@ use super::liveness::NodeLivenessState;
 pub enum EvictionReason {
     /// Too many consecutive communication failures

thinking
**Inspecting routing maintenance scheduler**
thinking
**Inspecting routing maintenance scheduler**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/routing_maintenance/scheduler.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/routing_maintenance/scheduler.rs b/src/dht/routing_maintenance/scheduler.rs
index 1a32371..53df87d 100644
--- a/src/dht/routing_maintenance/scheduler.rs
+++ b/src/dht/routing_maintenance/scheduler.rs
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 //! Background task scheduler for routing maintenance
 //!
 //! Coordinates periodic maintenance tasks:
 //! - Bucket refresh operations
 //! - Node liveness checks
-//! - Data attestation challenges
 //! - Eviction evaluation
 //!
 //! Copyright 2024 Saorsa Labs
 //! SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later OR Commercial
 
@@ -18,12 +17,10 @@ use super::config::MaintenanceConfig;
 pub enum MaintenanceTask {
     /// Refresh k-buckets
     BucketRefresh,

thinking
**Checking for bugs in update metrics**
thinking
**Checking for bugs in update metrics**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/adaptive/coordinator.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
diff --git a/src/adaptive/coordinator.rs b/src/adaptive/coordinator.rs
index 8d36017..86deb7a 100644
--- a/src/adaptive/coordinator.rs
+++ b/src/adaptive/coordinator.rs
@@ -416,18 +416,28 @@ impl NetworkCoordinator {
         let router = Arc::new(AdaptiveRouter::new(trust_engine.clone()));
         // Store references for potential future use
         let _hyperbolic_space = hyperbolic_space.clone();
         let _som = som.clone();
 
-        // Initialize DHT
+        // Initialize ML components early so AdaptiveDHT can use the same predictors
+        let churn_predictor = Arc::new(ChurnPredictor::new());
+
+        // Initialize DHT with shared adaptive layers
         let dht_config = crate::dht::DHTConfig::default();
+        let dht_dependencies = AdaptiveDhtDependencies::new(
+            identity.clone(),
+            trust_engine.clone(),
+            router.clone(),

thinking
**Checking async usage mismatch**

I'm investigating if `AdaptiveRouter::get_all_strategies` became async but call sites forgot to await it, which could cause compile errors. Next, I'll search for how `get_all_strategies` is used.
thinking
**Checking async usage mismatch**

I'm investigating if `AdaptiveRouter::get_all_strategies` became async but call sites forgot to await it, which could cause compile errors. Next, I'll search for how `get_all_strategies` is used.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "get_all_strategies" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 29ms:
src/adaptive/routing.rs:188:    pub async fn get_all_strategies(&self) -> HashMap<String, Arc<dyn RoutingStrategy>> {
src/adaptive/replication.rs:168:        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:260:        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:298:        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;
src/adaptive/retrieval.rs:333:        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;


thinking
**Reviewing adaptive retrieval logic**

I confirmed call sites switched from sync to async properly and spotted subtle handling in weight normalization ensuring minimum totals. Noted a possible edge case if replication factor is zero affecting candidate counts, but likely handled elsewhere. Also verified async GET calls count attempted hops correctly despite concurrency, and early returns on local hits seem safe since value is already stored locally.
thinking
**Analyzing store/retrieve key and content hash mismatch**

I found a pre-existing mismatch where `store` uses a DHT key derived from input key but returns a content hash based on key+value, while `retrieve` expects the content hash as the DHT key—this inconsistency can cause retrieval failures unless the key is the content hash itself. The recent code change to use raw keys if 32 bytes alters behavior but does not fix the fundamental mismatch, indicating the bug is longstanding rather than newly introduced.
thinking
**Reviewing adaptive retrieval logic**

I confirmed call sites switched from sync to async properly and spotted subtle handling in weight normalization ensuring minimum totals. Noted a possible edge case if replication factor is zero affecting candidate counts, but likely handled elsewhere. Also verified async GET calls count attempted hops correctly despite concurrency, and early returns on local hits seem safe since value is already stored locally.
thinking
**Analyzing store/retrieve key and content hash mismatch**

I found a pre-existing mismatch where `store` uses a DHT key derived from input key but returns a content hash based on key+value, while `retrieve` expects the content hash as the DHT key—this inconsistency can cause retrieval failures unless the key is the content hash itself. The recent code change to use raw keys if 32 bytes alters behavior but does not fix the fundamental mismatch, indicating the bug is longstanding rather than newly introduced.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/transport/ant_quic_adapter.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
diff --git a/src/transport/ant_quic_adapter.rs b/src/transport/ant_quic_adapter.rs
index c94b0ec..79172ca 100644
--- a/src/transport/ant_quic_adapter.rs
+++ b/src/transport/ant_quic_adapter.rs
@@ -172,11 +172,11 @@ impl P2PNetworkNode<P2pLinkTransport> {
     }
 
     /// Create a new P2P network node from NetworkConfig
     pub async fn from_network_config(
         bind_addr: SocketAddr,
-        net_config: &crate::messaging::NetworkConfig,
+        net_config: &crate::transport::NetworkConfig,
     ) -> Result<Self> {
         // Build P2pConfig based on NetworkConfig
         let mut builder = P2pConfig::builder()
             .bind_addr(bind_addr)
             .max_connections(DEFAULT_MAX_CONNECTIONS)

thinking
**Inspecting type definitions changes**
thinking
**Inspecting type definitions changes**
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/types.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
diff --git a/src/types.rs b/src/types.rs
index 53d248c..d2dd61d 100644
--- a/src/types.rs
+++ b/src/types.rs
@@ -20,21 +20,11 @@ pub struct Forward {
     pub proto: String,
     pub addr: String,
     pub exp: u64,
 }
 
-// New clean types modules
-pub mod identity;
-pub mod presence;
-pub mod storage;
-
-// Re-export main types
-pub use identity::{Identity, IdentityHandle, MlDsaKeyPair};
-pub use presence::{
-    Device, DeviceCapabilities, DeviceId, DeviceType, Endpoint, Presence, PresenceReceipt,
-};

thinking
**Analyzing recent changes for bugs**

I'm planning to inspect modifications in key files like `replication.rs` and `retrieval.rs` to identify potential bugs introduced by making `get_all_strategies` async or other recent changes.
thinking
**Analyzing recent changes for bugs**

I'm planning to inspect modifications in key files like `replication.rs` and `retrieval.rs` to identify potential bugs introduced by making `get_all_strategies` async or other recent changes.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/adaptive/replication.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
diff --git a/src/adaptive/replication.rs b/src/adaptive/replication.rs
index ebc0f14..1a53788 100644
--- a/src/adaptive/replication.rs
+++ b/src/adaptive/replication.rs
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ impl ReplicationManager {
     ) -> Result<Vec<NodeId>> {
         // Get candidate nodes using different strategies
         let mut candidates = HashMap::new();
 
         // Get nodes from each routing strategy
-        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies();
+        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;
         for (strategy_name, strategy) in strategies {
             let nodes = strategy
                 .find_closest_nodes(_content_hash, count * 2)
                 .await?;
             for node in nodes {

thinking
**Inspecting retrieval module diff**

I'm checking the changes in the retrieval module to verify if any errors were introduced there.
thinking
**Inspecting retrieval module diff**

I'm checking the changes in the retrieval module to verify if any errors were introduced there.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/adaptive/retrieval.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 26ms:
diff --git a/src/adaptive/retrieval.rs b/src/adaptive/retrieval.rs
index 7e0c7fd..9a386ad 100644
--- a/src/adaptive/retrieval.rs
+++ b/src/adaptive/retrieval.rs
@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ impl RetrievalManager {
     /// Kademlia-based retrieval
     async fn kademlia_retrieve(&self, content_hash: &ContentHash) -> Result<RetrievalResult> {
         let start_time = Instant::now();
 
         // Get Kademlia routing strategy
-        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies();
+        let strategies = self.router.get_all_strategies().await;
         let kademlia_strategy = strategies
             .get("Kademlia")
             .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Kademlia strategy not available"))?;
 
         // Find nodes storing this content (α=3 parallel as per spec)
@@ -293,11 +293,11 @@ impl RetrievalManager {
     /// Hyperbolic greedy routing retrieval
     async fn hyperbolic_retrieve(&self, content_hash: &ContentHash) -> Result<RetrievalResult> {

thinking
**Verifying module removal impact**

The large module removal is accompanied by updates removing corresponding references, suggesting the code will compile; next, I'll review the Cargo.toml changes to confirm dependencies align.
thinking
**Verifying module removal impact**

The large module removal is accompanied by updates removing corresponding references, suggesting the code will compile; next, I'll review the Cargo.toml changes to confirm dependencies align.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 Cargo.toml' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 25ms:
diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index 603db3d..1ee7293 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -25,19 +25,10 @@ metrics = ["dep:prometheus"]
 mocks = []
 ## Optional: enable hyperbolic greedy routing helpers in API
 h2_greedy = []
 # Test utilities including mock DHT for integration tests
 test-utils = []
-# Entangled Attestation system (Phase 1: Entangled Identity)
-# Enables EntangledId derivation and verification for software attestation
-attestation = []
-# Enable real SP1 zkVM proof generation (requires SP1 SDK and toolchain)
-# Without this feature, a mock prover is used for testing
-zkvm-prover = ["dep:sp1-sdk"]
-# Enable SP1 Groth16/PLONK verification (lightweight, NOT post-quantum secure)
-# Use for on-chain verification compatibility only
-zkvm-verifier-groth16 = ["dep:sp1-verifier"]
 

thinking
**Focusing on potential concurrency or logic issues**

I'm planning to inspect changes in `src/adaptive/coordinator.rs` and the `dht_network_manager` area, especially examining diffs in `src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs` to identify any concurrency or logic problems.
thinking
**Focusing on potential concurrency or logic issues**

I'm planning to inspect changes in `src/adaptive/coordinator.rs` and the `dht_network_manager` area, especially examining diffs in `src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs` to identify any concurrency or logic problems.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
diff --git a/src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs b/src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs
index f313f79..1eff56c 100644
--- a/src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs
+++ b/src/dht/authenticated_sibling_broadcast.rs
@@ -61,25 +61,23 @@ pub struct SignedSiblingEntry {
 pub struct MembershipProof {
     /// Proof type
     pub proof_type: MembershipProofType,
     /// Proof data (signatures, paths, etc.)
     pub proof_data: Vec<u8>,
-    /// Witness nodes that attest to membership
+    /// Peer validators that vouch for membership
     pub witnesses: Vec<PeerId>,
-    /// Witness signatures
+    /// Validator signatures
     pub witness_signatures: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
 }
 
 /// Types of membership proofs
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]


thinking
**Reviewing potential address and scoring inconsistencies**

I'm assessing possible issues in address parsing with `Multiaddr::from_str` and trust scoring in candidate selection, focusing on how low-trust nodes might still be selected and whether hyperbolic coordinate updates for target nodes fit expected usage in `HyperbolicSpace`.
thinking
**Clarifying address parsing and minor metric inaccuracy**

I'm confirming `Multiaddr::from_str` expects multiaddr format while candidate addresses may be plain IP:port strings, causing parsing to fail harmlessly. Also noting a minor metric issue where early local gets skip hop count updates, but no critical bugs found so far.
thinking
**Reviewing potential address and scoring inconsistencies**

I'm assessing possible issues in address parsing with `Multiaddr::from_str` and trust scoring in candidate selection, focusing on how low-trust nodes might still be selected and whether hyperbolic coordinate updates for target nodes fit expected usage in `HyperbolicSpace`.
thinking
**Clarifying address parsing and minor metric inaccuracy**

I'm confirming `Multiaddr::from_str` expects multiaddr format while candidate addresses may be plain IP:port strings, causing parsing to fail harmlessly. Also noting a minor metric issue where early local gets skip hop count updates, but no critical bugs found so far.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'git diff -U5 src/identity/enhanced.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 27ms:
diff --git a/src/identity/enhanced.rs b/src/identity/enhanced.rs
index 4f1c85a..e6fb36b 100644
--- a/src/identity/enhanced.rs
+++ b/src/identity/enhanced.rs
@@ -218,34 +218,34 @@ pub struct Team {
 }
 
 /// Organization settings
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct OrganizationSettings {
-    pub default_chat_encryption: bool,
+    pub default_data_encryption: bool,
     pub require_2fa: bool,
     pub session_timeout: std::time::Duration,
     pub allowed_domains: Vec<String>,
     pub features: OrganizationFeatures,
 }
 
 /// Organization features
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]

thinking
**Checking field rename impact across code**

I'm searching for references to the renamed fields beyond their defining file to ensure no usages still point to the old names, preventing potential bugs.
thinking
**Checking field rename impact across code**

I'm searching for references to the renamed fields beyond their defining file to ensure no usages still point to the old names, preventing potential bugs.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "default_chat_encryption|chat_enabled|discuss_enabled|projects_enabled|voice_video_enabled" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core exited 1 in 25ms:



thinking
**Identifying candidate bugs in node handling**

Noticed potential bug where remote `NodeDescriptor` incorrectly uses local `public_key`, and mapping node IDs to `PeerId` may cause issues when sending network operations. These spots warrant closer inspection.
thinking
**Pinpointing trust scoring bug in local backend**

Found that local backend now hashes node ID strings to produce NodeId, causing mismatch with trust provider keys and breaking trust-based filtering. This is a new bug introduced by recent changes affecting local DHT routing trust calculations.
thinking
**Identifying candidate bugs in node handling**

Noticed potential bug where remote `NodeDescriptor` incorrectly uses local `public_key`, and mapping node IDs to `PeerId` may cause issues when sending network operations. These spots warrant closer inspection.
thinking
**Pinpointing trust scoring bug in local backend**

Found that local backend now hashes node ID strings to produce NodeId, causing mismatch with trust provider keys and breaking trust-based filtering. This is a new bug introduced by recent changes affecting local DHT routing trust calculations.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "nl -ba src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs | sed -n '600,760p'" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
   600	                let nodes = dht_guard
   601	                    .find_nodes(&DhtKey::from_bytes(*key), count)
   602	                    .await
   603	                    .unwrap_or_default();
   604	                Ok(nodes
   605	                    .into_iter()
   606	                    .map(|node| CandidateNode {
   607	                        peer_id: node.id.to_string(),
   608	                        address: node.address,
   609	                        reliability: node.capacity.reliability_score,
   610	                    })
   611	                    .collect())
   612	            }
   613	            AdaptiveDhtBackend::Network { manager } => manager
   614	                .find_closest_nodes(key, count)
   615	                .await
   616	                .map(|nodes| {
   617	                    nodes
   618	                        .into_iter()
   619	                        .map(|node| CandidateNode {


thinking
**Identifying trust ID mismatch bug**

The local backend converts node IDs to strings before hashing for NodeId, causing mismatches with trust providers and scoring nodes as untrusted. This likely breaks trust-weighted routing and should be noted with code references and a comment explaining why using raw NodeId bytes or passing NodeId directly avoids the issue.
thinking
**Analyzing potential bugs in candidate handling and routing**

I'm pinpointing the local backend bug where converting node IDs to strings mismatches trust hashes and marking it P2 with precise code references; I'm also noting a possible P3 issue where metrics might not update when local values return. Additional concerns include empty candidate lists causing get operations to return none and ensuring routing strategy traits are properly marked Send + Sync after async changes.
thinking
**Identifying trust ID mismatch bug**

The local backend converts node IDs to strings before hashing for NodeId, causing mismatches with trust providers and scoring nodes as untrusted. This likely breaks trust-weighted routing and should be noted with code references and a comment explaining why using raw NodeId bytes or passing NodeId directly avoids the issue.
thinking
**Analyzing potential bugs in candidate handling and routing**

I'm pinpointing the local backend bug where converting node IDs to strings mismatches trust hashes and marking it P2 with precise code references; I'm also noting a possible P3 issue where metrics might not update when local values return. Additional concerns include empty candidate lists causing get operations to return none and ensuring routing strategy traits are properly marked Send + Sync after async changes.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "trait RoutingStrategy" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 23ms:
src/adaptive/mod.rs:259:pub trait RoutingStrategy: Send + Sync {


thinking
**Identifying potential bug in node ID handling**

The code sets the public key to the local identity in a way that mismatches NodeDescriptor's remote ID, which could cause verification failures or misrepresent remote nodes, indicating a potential bug in node identity representation.
thinking
**Spotting address parsing inconsistency**

Candidate node addresses stored as raw strings like "ip:port" fail parsing into Multiaddr, causing empty address lists and likely preventing remote connections; this mismatch suggests a critical bug in address handling.
thinking
**Identifying potential bug in node ID handling**

The code sets the public key to the local identity in a way that mismatches NodeDescriptor's remote ID, which could cause verification failures or misrepresent remote nodes, indicating a potential bug in node identity representation.
thinking
**Spotting address parsing inconsistency**

Candidate node addresses stored as raw strings like "ip:port" fail parsing into Multiaddr, causing empty address lists and likely preventing remote connections; this mismatch suggests a critical bug in address handling.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "type Multiaddr|struct Multiaddr" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 28ms:
src/lib.rs:332:pub type Multiaddr = NetworkAddress;
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '300,360p' src/lib.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
    ParticipantId,
    PeerId as QuantumPeerId,
    QuantumPeerIdentity,
    SecureSession,
    SessionId,
    SessionState,
};

// Placement system exports
pub use placement::{
    AuditSystem, DataPointer, DhtRecord, DiversityEnforcer, GeographicLocation, GroupBeacon,
    NetworkRegion, NodeAd, PlacementConfig, PlacementDecision, PlacementEngine, PlacementMetrics,
    PlacementOrchestrator, RegisterPointer, RepairSystem, StorageOrchestrator,
    WeightedPlacementStrategy,
};

// Network address types
/// Peer identifier used throughout Saorsa
///
/// Currently implemented as a String for simplicity, but should be enhanced

thinking
**Searching for NetworkAddress definition**

I'm checking `src/transport.rs` to locate the definition of NetworkAddress and confirm its relation to Multiaddr aliasing.
thinking
**Searching for NetworkAddress definition**

I'm checking `src/transport.rs` to locate the definition of NetworkAddress and confirm its relation to Multiaddr aliasing.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "struct NetworkAddress|enum NetworkAddress" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 49ms:
src/address.rs:30:pub struct NetworkAddress {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '1,120p' src/address.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 16ms:
// Copyright 2024 Saorsa Labs Limited
//
// This software is dual-licensed under:
// - GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later (AGPL-3.0-or-later)
// - Commercial License
//
// For AGPL-3.0 license, see LICENSE-AGPL-3.0
// For commercial licensing, contact: david@saorsalabs.com
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under these licenses is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.

//! # Address Types
//!
//! This module provides address types for the P2P network using IP:port combinations
//! and four-word human-readable representations.

use std::fmt::{self, Display};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};

thinking
**Checking for FromStr implementation**

I'm searching for an implementation of FromStr for NetworkAddress to confirm if it supports parsing from strings.
thinking
**Checking for FromStr implementation**

I'm searching for an implementation of FromStr for NetworkAddress to confirm if it supports parsing from strings.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "impl FromStr for NetworkAddress" -S src/address.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
151:impl FromStr for NetworkAddress {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '140,180p' src/address.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 15ms:

impl Display for NetworkAddress {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        if let Some(ref words) = self.four_words {
            write!(f, "{} ({})", self.socket_addr, words)
        } else {
            write!(f, "{}", self.socket_addr)
        }
    }
}

impl FromStr for NetworkAddress {
    type Err = anyhow::Error;

    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self> {
        // First try to parse as a socket address
        if let Ok(socket_addr) = SocketAddr::from_str(s) {
            return Ok(Self::new(socket_addr));
        }


thinking
**Flagging metric update oversight**

I found that the patch introduced a metrics update gap on local store hits, which could bias adaptivity decisions based on lookup success rates and hops. Next, I'll verify where these metrics influence routing or performance logic to assess impact.
thinking
**Flagging metric update oversight**

I found that the patch introduced a metrics update gap on local store hits, which could bias adaptivity decisions based on lookup success rates and hops. Next, I'll verify where these metrics influence routing or performance logic to assess impact.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "lookups_successful|average_lookup_hops|lookups_total" -S src' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 28ms:
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:216:    pub lookups_total: u64,
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:217:    pub lookups_successful: u64,
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:220:    pub average_lookup_hops: f64,
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:702:        metrics.lookups_total += 1;
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:762:        let total = metrics.lookups_total as f64;
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:765:            metrics.average_lookup_hops =
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:766:                (metrics.average_lookup_hops * (total - 1.0) + hops) / total;
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:769:            metrics.lookups_successful += 1;
src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:943:        assert_eq!(metrics.lookups_total, 0);


thinking
**Identifying potential DHT bugs**

I found several possible issues including the local backend's handling of replication, the candidate selection returning fewer nodes than expected, weight enforcement logic, and a mismatch in how node IDs are derived from peer IDs versus public keys in candidate nodes.
thinking
**Confirming trust ID mismatch bug**

I pinpointed a clear functional bug where the local backend’s peer ID strings hashed into NodeIds don’t align with trust provider’s expected NodeIds from public keys, causing all trust scores to default to zero and effectively disabling trust-based selection.
thinking
**Identifying potential DHT bugs**

I found several possible issues including the local backend's handling of replication, the candidate selection returning fewer nodes than expected, weight enforcement logic, and a mismatch in how node IDs are derived from peer IDs versus public keys in candidate nodes.
thinking
**Confirming trust ID mismatch bug**

I pinpointed a clear functional bug where the local backend’s peer ID strings hashed into NodeIds don’t align with trust provider’s expected NodeIds from public keys, causing all trust scores to default to zero and effectively disabling trust-based selection.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "nl -ba src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs | sed -n '320,420p'" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
   320	            config,
   321	            trust_provider: dependencies.trust_provider,
   322	            router: dependencies.router,
   323	            hyperbolic_space: dependencies.hyperbolic_space,
   324	            som: dependencies.som,
   325	            churn_predictor: dependencies.churn_predictor,
   326	            geo_integration,
   327	            identity: dependencies.identity,
   328	            metrics: Arc::new(RwLock::new(DHTMetrics::default())),
   329	        })
   330	    }
   331	
   332	    /// Convert adaptive NodeId to DHT key
   333	    fn node_id_to_key(node_id: &NodeId) -> DhtKeyBytes {
   334	        node_id.hash
   335	    }
   336	
   337	    fn key_to_node_id(key: &DhtKeyBytes) -> NodeId {
   338	        NodeId::from_bytes(*key)
   339	    }

thinking
**Mapping bug to candidate nodes**

The core bug involves hashing local DHT node IDs via `peer_id_to_node_id`, misaligning IDs for candidate nodes around lines 606-608; referencing `node.id.to_string()` feeding into this function clarifies the source of the mismatch. Next, I'll verify if `score_candidates` also uses `peer_id_to_node_id` around line 440 to check for related issues.
thinking
**Mapping bug to candidate nodes**

The core bug involves hashing local DHT node IDs via `peer_id_to_node_id`, misaligning IDs for candidate nodes around lines 606-608; referencing `node.id.to_string()` feeding into this function clarifies the source of the mismatch. Next, I'll verify if `score_candidates` also uses `peer_id_to_node_id` around line 440 to check for related issues.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "nl -ba src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs | sed -n '470,560p'" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 20ms:
   470	            1.0
   471	        };
   472	
   473	        let mut scored = Vec::with_capacity(candidates.len());
   474	        let mut trust_rejections = 0u64;
   475	
   476	        for candidate in candidates {
   477	            let node_id = Self::peer_id_to_node_id(&candidate.peer_id);
   478	            let address = Multiaddr::from_str(&candidate.address).ok();
   479	            let region = self.detect_region(&address).await;
   480	            let trust = self.trust_provider.get_trust(&node_id).clamp(0.0, 1.0);
   481	            if trust < self.config.min_trust_threshold {
   482	                trust_rejections += 1;
   483	            }
   484	
   485	            let prediction = self.churn_predictor.predict(&node_id).await;
   486	            let churn_risk = (prediction.probability_1h * 0.6
   487	                + prediction.probability_6h * 0.3
   488	                + prediction.probability_24h * 0.1)
   489	                .clamp(0.0, 1.0);


thinking
**Noticing peer_id hashing bug**

The conversion of candidate.peer_id to node_id hashes a string that's already a hex DHT NodeId in the local backend, causing mismatched trust lookups; I'll document this bug around the code where this conversion happens to clarify the difference between local and network backends.
thinking
**Identifying potential NodeId-public key mismatch**

There's a possible bug where `find_closest_nodes` uses the local public key for all nodes, causing node descriptors to have mismatched public keys and failing security validation; also, node_id creation in `DhtNetworkManager::new_with_node` may inconsistently handle peer_id bytes without hashing, so I'll verify node_id generation in related constructors next.
thinking
**Noticing peer_id hashing bug**

The conversion of candidate.peer_id to node_id hashes a string that's already a hex DHT NodeId in the local backend, causing mismatched trust lookups; I'll document this bug around the code where this conversion happens to clarify the difference between local and network backends.
thinking
**Identifying potential NodeId-public key mismatch**

There's a possible bug where `find_closest_nodes` uses the local public key for all nodes, causing node descriptors to have mismatched public keys and failing security validation; also, node_id creation in `DhtNetworkManager::new_with_node` may inconsistently handle peer_id bytes without hashing, so I'll verify node_id generation in related constructors next.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "Creating DHT Network Manager" -n src/dht_network_manager.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
329:            "Creating DHT Network Manager for peer: {}",
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '300,380p' src/dht_network_manager.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 18ms:
    Error { error: String },
}

/// DHT network statistics
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct DhtNetworkStats {
    /// Total operations performed
    pub total_operations: u64,
    /// Successful operations
    pub successful_operations: u64,
    /// Failed operations
    pub failed_operations: u64,
    /// Average operation latency
    pub avg_operation_latency: Duration,
    /// Total bytes sent
    pub bytes_sent: u64,
    /// Total bytes received
    pub bytes_received: u64,
    /// Connected DHT peers
    pub connected_peers: usize,

thinking
**Identifying potential security bug in node descriptor creation**

I found that in `find_closest_nodes`, the NodeDescriptor is created using the local identity's public key, which seems incorrect and could cause security issues or mismatches. Next, I'll review the surrounding code in `dht_integration.rs` to confirm this and look for a second bug.
thinking
**Identifying potential security bug in node descriptor creation**

I found that in `find_closest_nodes`, the NodeDescriptor is created using the local identity's public key, which seems incorrect and could cause security issues or mismatches. Next, I'll review the surrounding code in `dht_integration.rs` to confirm this and look for a second bug.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "nl -ba src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs | sed -n '800,860p'" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
   800	    /// Retrieve value from DHT using a content hash key.
   801	    ///
   802	    /// Reserved for potential future use beyond peer phonebook/routing.
   803	    #[allow(dead_code)]
   804	    pub(crate) async fn retrieve(&self, hash: &ContentHash) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
   805	        match self.get(hash.0).await? {
   806	            Some(value) => Ok(value),
   807	            None => Err(AdaptiveNetworkError::Other("Record not found".to_string())),
   808	        }
   809	    }
   810	
   811	    /// Find nodes close to a key using trust-weighted selection
   812	    pub async fn find_closest_nodes(
   813	        &self,
   814	        target: &NodeId,
   815	        count: usize,
   816	    ) -> Result<Vec<NodeDescriptor>> {
   817	        let dht_key = target.hash;
   818	        let selected = self.select_targets(&dht_key, count).await?;
   819	


thinking
**Highlighting public key misuse risk**

The local public key is incorrectly used for all NodeDescriptors, which breaks identity verification since NodeDescriptor's public_key must correspond to its node ID; this will cause `SecurityManager::validate_node_join` and similar checks to fail when those nodes are used for joining or security validation.
thinking
**Confirming public key mismatch is longstanding**

The identity verification failure from using local or random public keys in NodeDescriptors isn’t new but the trust mismatch caused by returning local keys is a provable issue worth highlighting. Also, I’m shifting to inspect routing strategy key formatting for potential impact.
thinking
**Highlighting public key misuse risk**

The local public key is incorrectly used for all NodeDescriptors, which breaks identity verification since NodeDescriptor's public_key must correspond to its node ID; this will cause `SecurityManager::validate_node_join` and similar checks to fail when those nodes are used for joining or security validation.
thinking
**Confirming public key mismatch is longstanding**

The identity verification failure from using local or random public keys in NodeDescriptors isn’t new but the trust mismatch caused by returning local keys is a provable issue worth highlighting. Also, I’m shifting to inspect routing strategy key formatting for potential impact.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "enum StrategyChoice" -S src/adaptive/mod.rs' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
350:pub enum StrategyChoice {
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "sed -n '340,380p' src/adaptive/mod.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 17ms:
/// Current network conditions
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct NetworkConditions {
    pub connected_peers: usize,
    pub avg_latency_ms: f64,
    pub churn_rate: f64,
}

/// Strategy choice made by learning system
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum StrategyChoice {
    Kademlia,
    Hyperbolic,
    TrustPath,
    SOMRegion,
}

/// Outcome of a strategy choice
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Outcome {


thinking
**Noticing key mismatch for SOM strategy**

The debug formatting returns "SOMRegion" but retrieval expects "SOM", so the key for the SOM strategy won’t match, causing retrieval to fail for that strategy.
thinking
**Confirming retrieval key mismatch causes new SOM bug**

The key mismatch for "SOM" versus "SOMRegion" causes retrieval for SOM to fail now, while Kademlia and Hyperbolic succeed; this bug emerged after adding the strategies map since previously it was empty and retrieval always failed.
thinking
**Noticing key mismatch for SOM strategy**

The debug formatting returns "SOMRegion" but retrieval expects "SOM", so the key for the SOM strategy won’t match, causing retrieval to fail for that strategy.
thinking
**Confirming retrieval key mismatch causes new SOM bug**

The key mismatch for "SOM" versus "SOMRegion" causes retrieval for SOM to fail now, while Kademlia and Hyperbolic succeed; this bug emerged after adding the strategies map since previously it was empty and retrieval always failed.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "rg -n \"get\\(\\\"\" -S src/adaptive/retrieval.rs" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
262:            .get("Kademlia")
300:            .get("Hyperbolic")
335:            .get("SOM")
519:        assert_eq!(stats.success_by_strategy.get("local"), Some(&1));


thinking
**Identifying strategy naming mismatch**

The retrieval fails for "SOM" because the keys use "SOMRegion" while retrieval calls "SOM", causing a new bug after switching to debug format strings; this mismatch affects only SOM, not Kademlia or Hyperbolic, and may require aligning key naming or retrieval strings.
thinking
**Confirming partial bug persistence**

The mismatch between retrieval expecting "SOM" and keys using "SOMRegion" persists but likely isn't newly introduced since retrieval always failed with empty maps before; the patch fixes other strategies but leaves SOM retrieval broken due to naming inconsistency.
thinking
**Identifying strategy naming mismatch**

The retrieval fails for "SOM" because the keys use "SOMRegion" while retrieval calls "SOM", causing a new bug after switching to debug format strings; this mismatch affects only SOM, not Kademlia or Hyperbolic, and may require aligning key naming or retrieval strings.
thinking
**Confirming partial bug persistence**

The mismatch between retrieval expecting "SOM" and keys using "SOMRegion" persists but likely isn't newly introduced since retrieval always failed with empty maps before; the patch fixes other strategies but leaves SOM retrieval broken due to naming inconsistency.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc 'rg -n "SOMRegion" -S src/adaptive' in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 22ms:
src/adaptive/multi_armed_bandit.rs:490:                            "SOMRegion" => StrategyChoice::SOMRegion,
src/adaptive/routing.rs:560:                | StrategyChoice::SOMRegion
src/adaptive/learning.rs:112:            StrategyChoice::SOMRegion,
src/adaptive/learning.rs:1497:                    | StrategyChoice::SOMRegion
src/adaptive/learning.rs:1614:                StrategyChoice::SOMRegion,
src/adaptive/learning.rs:1622:        ts.reset_strategy(ContentType::RealtimeMessage, StrategyChoice::SOMRegion)
src/adaptive/learning.rs:1627:            .get_confidence_interval(ContentType::RealtimeMessage, StrategyChoice::SOMRegion)
src/adaptive/learning.rs:1656:                | StrategyChoice::SOMRegion
src/adaptive/mod.rs:354:    SOMRegion,


thinking
**Identifying naming mismatch bug**

Found a pre-existing inconsistency between "SOMRegion" strategy names and retrieval using "SOM" strings; the patch populates the strategy map without aligning these names, causing SOM retrieval to fail now when it previously returned empty, revealing a new bug triggered by the recent changes.
thinking
**Flagging trust ID mismatch and metrics bugs**

The patch introduces trust scoring failures for the local backend by hashing node IDs differently, causing trust lookups to always return zero and bypass weighting; it also adds an early return on local cache hits that skips updating successful lookup metrics, leading to undercounted metrics and potential skew in adaptation.
thinking
**Identifying naming mismatch bug**

Found a pre-existing inconsistency between "SOMRegion" strategy names and retrieval using "SOM" strings; the patch populates the strategy map without aligning these names, causing SOM retrieval to fail now when it previously returned empty, revealing a new bug triggered by the recent changes.
thinking
**Flagging trust ID mismatch and metrics bugs**

The patch introduces trust scoring failures for the local backend by hashing node IDs differently, causing trust lookups to always return zero and bypass weighting; it also adds an early return on local cache hits that skips updating successful lookup metrics, leading to undercounted metrics and potential skew in adaptation.
exec
/bin/zsh -lc "nl -ba src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs | sed -n '716,732p'" in /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core succeeded in 19ms:
   716	            AdaptiveDhtBackend::Local { dht } => dht
   717	                .read()
   718	                .await
   719	                .retrieve(&DhtKey::from_bytes(key))
   720	                .await
   721	                .map_err(|e| AdaptiveNetworkError::Other(e.to_string())),
   722	            AdaptiveDhtBackend::Network { manager } => {
   723	                if let Ok(Some(value)) = manager.get_local(&key).await {
   724	                    return Ok(Some(value));
   725	                }
   726	
   727	                let selected = self.select_targets(&key, replication_factor).await?;
   728	                if selected.is_empty() {
   729	                    return Ok(None);
   730	                }
   731	
   732	                let mut futures = FuturesUnordered::new();


thinking
**Summarizing key bug explanations**

I'm detailing the first bug about trust mismatches where the local backend's CandidateNode peer_id and TrustProvider keys differ, causing trust scores to always be zero and disrupting routing, and the fix involves storing consistent NodeId bytes; the second bug highlights skipped metric updates on local cache hits leading to undercounted lookups that could skew adaptive metrics.
thinking
**Detailing fix proposals and JSON schema**

I've specified concise comment bodies explaining the trust ID mismatch and metric update bugs with scenarios and fixes, confirmed inclusive line ranges, and finalized confidence scores and overall evaluation for the JSON output schema to report the patch as incorrect.
thinking
**Summarizing key bug explanations**

I'm detailing the first bug about trust mismatches where the local backend's CandidateNode peer_id and TrustProvider keys differ, causing trust scores to always be zero and disrupting routing, and the fix involves storing consistent NodeId bytes; the second bug highlights skipped metric updates on local cache hits leading to undercounted lookups that could skew adaptive metrics.
thinking
**Detailing fix proposals and JSON schema**

I've specified concise comment bodies explaining the trust ID mismatch and metric update bugs with scenarios and fixes, confirmed inclusive line ranges, and finalized confidence scores and overall evaluation for the JSON output schema to report the patch as incorrect.
codex
The changes introduce functional issues in AdaptiveDHT: trust scores are effectively bypassed for local backends due to NodeId mis-mapping, and lookup metrics are skipped on local cache hits. These are likely to affect routing decisions and monitoring accuracy.

Full review comments:

- [P2] Preserve node IDs for trust scoring — /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:606-608
  For the local backend, `peer_id` is derived from `node.id.to_string()`, but `score_candidates` later hashes this string in `peer_id_to_node_id`, producing a different `NodeId` than the DHT node ID derived from the user’s public key. That means `trust_provider.get_trust` will miss cached scores and treat every candidate as untrusted, effectively disabling trust-weighted selection whenever `AdaptiveDHT::new` (the default coordinator path) is used. Consider carrying the actual node ID bytes (or storing a `NodeId` directly on `CandidateNode`) for local candidates instead of re-hashing the string form.

- [P3] Update lookup metrics on local cache hits — /Users/davidirvine/Desktop/Devel/projects/saorsa-core/src/adaptive/dht_integration.rs:723-724
  When a network-backed lookup hits `manager.get_local`, the function returns immediately without incrementing `lookups_successful` or updating `average_lookup_hops`, so local cache hits never show up in `DHTMetrics`. If those metrics are used for monitoring or adaptive routing decisions, they will be skewed whenever a key is already cached. Update the metrics before returning or move the accounting to cover the early return path.
