pub(crate) mod as_exchange;
mod cache;
mod extractors;
mod generators;

use std::time::Duration;

use cache::AuthenticatorCacheRecord;
use picky::oids;
use picky_asn1::restricted_string::IA5String;
use picky_asn1::wrapper::{Asn1SequenceOf, ExplicitContextTag0, ExplicitContextTag1, IntegerAsn1};
use picky_krb::constants::gss_api::{AP_REP_TOKEN_ID, AP_REQ_TOKEN_ID};
use picky_krb::constants::types::NT_SRV_INST;
use picky_krb::data_types::{AuthenticatorInner, KerberosStringAsn1, PrincipalName};
use picky_krb::gss_api::MechTypeList;
use picky_krb::messages::{ApRep, ApReq};
use rand::rngs::{StdRng, SysRng};
use rand::{RngCore, SeedableRng};
use time::OffsetDateTime;

use self::cache::AuthenticatorsCache;
use self::extractors::{decrypt_ap_req_authenticator, decrypt_ap_req_ticket};
use self::generators::generate_ap_rep;
use crate::builders::FilledAcceptSecurityContext;
use crate::generator::YieldPointLocal;
use crate::kerberos::DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_TYPE;
use crate::kerberos::client::extractors::extract_seq_number_from_ap_rep;
use crate::kerberos::flags::ApOptions;
use crate::kerberos::messages::{decode_krb_message, generate_krb_message};
use crate::kerberos::server::extractors::client_upn;
use crate::{
    AcceptSecurityContextResult, BufferType, CredentialsBuffers, Error, ErrorKind, Kerberos, KerberosState, Result,
    Secret, SecurityBuffer, SecurityStatus, ServerRequestFlags, ServerResponseFlags, SspiImpl, Username,
};

/// Additional properties that are needed only for server-side Kerberos.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ServerProperties {
    /// Supported mech types sent by the client in the first incoming message.
    /// We user them for checksum calculation during MIC token generation.
    pub mech_types: MechTypeList,
    /// Maximum allowed time difference between client and server clocks.
    /// It is recommended to set this value not greater then a few minutes.
    pub max_time_skew: Duration,
    /// Key that is used for TGS tickets decryption.
    /// It should be provided by the user during regular Kerberos auth. Or
    /// it will be established during AS exchange in the case of Kerberos U2U auth.
    pub ticket_decryption_key: Option<Secret<Vec<u8>>>,
    /// Name of the Kerberos service.
    pub service_name: PrincipalName,
    /// User credentials on whose behalf the TGT ticket will be requested.
    pub user: Option<CredentialsBuffers>,
    /// Username of the authenticated client.
    ///
    /// This field should be set by the Kerberos implementation after successful log on.
    pub client: Option<Username>,
    /// Authenticators cache.
    ///
    /// [Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ Message](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-3.2.3):
    ///
    /// > The server MUST utilize a replay cache to remember any authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew.
    /// > The replay cache will store at least the server name, along with the client name, time,
    /// > and microsecond fields from the recently-seen authenticators, and if a matching tuple is found,
    /// > the error is returned.
    pub authenticators_cache: AuthenticatorsCache,
}

impl ServerProperties {
    /// Creates a new instance of [ServerProperties].
    pub fn new(
        sname: &[&str],
        user: Option<CredentialsBuffers>,
        max_time_skew: Duration,
        ticket_decryption_key: Option<Secret<Vec<u8>>>,
    ) -> Result<Self> {
        let service_names = sname
            .iter()
            .map(|sname| Ok(KerberosStringAsn1::from(IA5String::from_string((*sname).to_owned())?)))
            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;

        Ok(Self {
            mech_types: MechTypeList::from(Vec::new()),
            max_time_skew,
            ticket_decryption_key,
            service_name: PrincipalName {
                name_type: ExplicitContextTag0::from(IntegerAsn1::from(vec![NT_SRV_INST])),
                name_string: ExplicitContextTag1::from(Asn1SequenceOf::from(service_names)),
            },
            user,
            client: None,
            authenticators_cache: AuthenticatorsCache::new(),
        })
    }
}

/// Performs one authentication step.
///
/// The user should call this function until it returns `SecurityStatus::Ok`.
pub async fn accept_security_context(
    server: &mut Kerberos,
    _yield_point: &mut YieldPointLocal,
    builder: FilledAcceptSecurityContext<'_, <Kerberos as SspiImpl>::CredentialsHandle>,
) -> Result<AcceptSecurityContextResult> {
    let input = builder
        .input
        .as_ref()
        .ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidToken, "input buffers must be specified"))?;
    let input_token = SecurityBuffer::find_buffer(input, BufferType::Token)?;

    let status = match server.state {
        KerberosState::Preauthentication => {
            let ap_req = if builder.context_requirements.contains(ServerRequestFlags::USE_DCE_STYLE) {
                picky_asn1_der::from_bytes::<ApReq>(&input_token.buffer)?
            } else {
                decode_krb_message::<ApReq>(&input_token.buffer, AP_REQ_TOKEN_ID)?
            };

            let server_data = server.server.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
                Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidHandle,
                    "Kerberos server properties are not initialized",
                )
            })?;

            let ticket_service_name = &ap_req.0.ticket.0.0.sname.0;
            if *ticket_service_name != server_data.service_name {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!(
                        "invalid ticket service name ({:?}): Kerberos server is configured for {:?}",
                        ticket_service_name, server_data.service_name
                    ),
                ));
            }

            let ticket_decryption_key = server_data
                .ticket_decryption_key
                .as_ref()
                .ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InternalError, "ticket decryption key is not set"))?;

            let ticket_enc_part = decrypt_ap_req_ticket(ticket_decryption_key, &ap_req)?;
            let session_key = Secret::new(ticket_enc_part.0.key.0.key_value.0.0.clone());

            let AuthenticatorInner {
                authenticator_vno: _,
                crealm,
                cname,
                cksum: _,
                cusec,
                ctime,
                subkey: _,
                seq_number: _,
                authorization_data: _,
            } = decrypt_ap_req_authenticator(&session_key, &ap_req)?.0;

            // [3.2.3.  Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ Message](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-3.2.3)
            // The name and realm of the client from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator.
            if ticket_enc_part.0.crealm.0 != crealm.0 || ticket_enc_part.0.cname != cname.0 {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    "the name and realm of the client in ticket and authenticator do not match",
                ));
            }

            let now = OffsetDateTime::now_utc();
            let client_time = OffsetDateTime::try_from(ctime.0.0.clone())
                .map_err(|err| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidToken, format!("clint time is not valid: {err:?}")))?;
            let max_time_skew = server_data.max_time_skew;

            if (now - client_time).abs() > max_time_skew {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::TimeSkew,
                    "invalid authenticator ctime: time skew is too big",
                ));
            }

            let ticket_start_time = ticket_enc_part
                .0
                .starttime
                .0
                .map(|start_time| start_time.0)
                // [5.3.  Tickets](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-5.3)
                // If the starttime field is absent from the ticket, then the authtime field SHOULD be used in its place to determine
                // the life of the ticket.
                .unwrap_or_else(|| ticket_enc_part.0.auth_time.0)
                .0;
            let ticket_start_time = OffsetDateTime::try_from(ticket_start_time).map_err(|err| {
                Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!("ticket end time is not valid: {err:?}"),
                )
            })?;
            if ticket_start_time > now + max_time_skew {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    "ticket not yet valid: ticket start time is greater than current time + max time skew",
                ));
            }

            let ticket_end_time = OffsetDateTime::try_from(ticket_enc_part.0.endtime.0.0).map_err(|err| {
                Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!("ticket end time is not valid: {err:?}"),
                )
            })?;
            if now > ticket_end_time + max_time_skew {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    "ticket is expired: current time is greater than ticket end time + max time skew",
                ));
            }

            let server_data = server.server.as_mut().ok_or_else(|| {
                Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidHandle,
                    "Kerberos server properties are not initialized",
                )
            })?;

            let cache_record = AuthenticatorCacheRecord {
                cname: cname.0.clone(),
                sname: ticket_service_name.clone(),
                ctime: ctime.0.clone(),
                microseconds: cusec.0.clone(),
            };
            if !server_data.authenticators_cache.contains(&cache_record) {
                server_data.authenticators_cache.insert(cache_record);
            } else {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    "ApReq Authenticator replay detected",
                ));
            }

            debug!("ApReq Ticket and Authenticator are valid!");

            server_data.client = Some(client_upn(&cname.0, &crealm.0)?);

            let ap_options_bytes = ap_req.0.ap_options.0.0.as_bytes();
            // [5.5.1.  KRB_AP_REQ Definition](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-5.5.1)
            // The `ap-options` field has 32 bits or 4 bytes long. But it is encoded as BitStringAsn1, so the first byte
            // indicates the number of bits used. Thus, the overall number of expected bytes is 1 + 4 = 5.
            if ap_options_bytes.len() != 1 + 4 {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!(
                        "invalid ApReq ap-options: invalid data length: expected 5 bytes but got {}",
                        ap_options_bytes.len()
                    ),
                ));
            }
            let ap_options =
                u32::from_be_bytes(ap_options_bytes[1..].try_into().map_err(|err| {
                    Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidToken, format!("invalid ApReq ap-options: {err:?}"))
                })?);
            let ap_options = ApOptions::from_bits(ap_options)
                .ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidToken, "invalid ApReq ap-options"))?;

            // [3.2.4.  Generation of a KRB_AP_REP Message](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-3.2.3)
            // ...the server need not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication is being performed,
            // the KRB_AP_REQ message will have MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message
            // is required in response.
            let status = if ap_options.contains(ApOptions::MUTUAL_REQUIRED) {
                let key_size = server
                    .encryption_params
                    .encryption_type
                    .as_ref()
                    .unwrap_or(&DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_TYPE)
                    .cipher()
                    .key_size();
                let mut sub_session_key = vec![0; key_size];

                let mut rand = StdRng::try_from_rng(&mut SysRng)?;
                rand.fill_bytes(&mut sub_session_key);
                server.encryption_params.sub_session_key = Some(sub_session_key.into());

                // [3.2.4.  Generation of a KRB_AP_REP Message](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4120#section-3.2.3)
                // A subkey MAY be included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey.
                // The KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the ticket.
                let ap_rep = generate_ap_rep(
                    &session_key,
                    ctime.0,
                    cusec.0,
                    (server.seq_number + 1).to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
                    &server.encryption_params,
                )?;

                let mech_id = if server.krb5_user_to_user {
                    oids::krb5_user_to_user()
                } else {
                    oids::krb5()
                };

                let (status, encoded_ap_rep) =
                    if builder.context_requirements.contains(ServerRequestFlags::USE_DCE_STYLE) {
                        let encoded_ap_rep = picky_asn1_der::to_vec(&ap_rep)?;
                        server.state = KerberosState::ApExchange;

                        (SecurityStatus::ContinueNeeded, encoded_ap_rep)
                    } else {
                        let encoded_ap_rep = generate_krb_message(mech_id, AP_REP_TOKEN_ID, ap_rep)?;
                        server.state = KerberosState::Final;

                        (SecurityStatus::Ok, encoded_ap_rep)
                    };

                let output_token = SecurityBuffer::find_buffer_mut(builder.output, BufferType::Token)?;
                output_token.buffer = encoded_ap_rep;

                status
            } else {
                SecurityStatus::Ok
            };

            server.encryption_params.session_key = Some(session_key);

            status
        }
        KerberosState::ApExchange => {
            if !builder.context_requirements.contains(ServerRequestFlags::USE_DCE_STYLE) {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::OutOfSequence,
                    "USE_DCE_STYLE flag must be set in context requirements",
                ));
            }

            let ap_rep = picky_asn1_der::from_bytes::<ApRep>(&input_token.buffer)?;

            let session_key = server
                .encryption_params
                .session_key
                .as_ref()
                .ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InternalError, "session key is not set"))?;
            let seq_number = extract_seq_number_from_ap_rep(&ap_rep, session_key, &server.encryption_params)?;
            let seq_number = u32::from_be_bytes(seq_number.try_into().map_err(|err| {
                Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!("invalid ApRep sequence number: {:?}", err),
                )
            })?);

            let expected_seq_number = server.seq_number + 1;
            if seq_number != expected_seq_number {
                return Err(Error::new(
                    ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
                    format!(
                        "invalid client ApRep sequence number: expected {expected_seq_number} but got {seq_number}",
                    ),
                ));
            }

            server.state = KerberosState::Final;

            SecurityStatus::Ok
        }
        KerberosState::Final => {
            return Err(Error::new(
                ErrorKind::OutOfSequence,
                format!("got wrong Kerberos state: {:?}", server.state),
            ));
        }
    };

    Ok(AcceptSecurityContextResult {
        status,
        flags: ServerResponseFlags::empty(),
        expiry: None,
    })
}
